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______________________________________________________________________ 
Broadening the scope of EU data protection law due to the entering into force of the 
General Data Protection Regulation has made many companies review their data 
processing practices. Especially changes have affected the non-EU entities which 
appeared to be pursued under the new Regulation for the activities that only yesterday 
were outside the territorial scope of law. 
This master‘s thesis aims at providing the comprehensive analysis of the conditions 
under which a non-EU controller or processor will be subject to the GDPR. For this 
purpose, it analyzes the grounds for the GDPR applicability from the non-EU 
controllers‘ and processors‘ perspective.   
Besides provision of the theoretical background regarding various concepts and 
processing activities, the work pays considerable attention to the practical side of the 
matter. It presents diverse examples of the GDPR applicability to the non-EU operators, 
including both the situations where certain evidences are sufficient to invoke the 
Regulation and, by contrast, those which are missing appropriate grounds.  
In addition, the paper is an attempt to fill up the gaps, which the EDPB has not 
addressed in the Guidelines on the territorial scope, and, where possible, to provide the 
probable solutions to the existing issues. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Topicality 
Broadening the scope of EU data protection law due to the entering into force of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter – GDPR) has made many companies 
review their data processing practices. Especially changes have affected the non-EU 
entities which appeared to be pursued under the new Regulation for the activities that 
only yesterday were outside the territorial scope of law. 
In comparison with the Data Protection Directive (hereinafter – DPD)
1
, the GDPR has 
substantially extended grounds for the applicability to the non-EU controllers and 
processors. The GDPR explains such enlargements in the scope of applicability with the 
need ―to ensure that natural persons are not deprived of the protection to which they are 
entitled under this Regulation‖
2
. Among major changes, one can find the law extension 
to the non-EU processors. Also, under the establishment principle, the place of 
processing has become irrelevant. What is more, the Regulation provides two 
fundamentally new grounds for the applicability to the non-EU operators – offering of 
goods or services and behavioral monitoring – united under the targeting principle.  
All these novelties complement the already existing establishment principle and add 
new conditions, or, if assessing from the non-EU-entities‘ perspective, issues. To a non-
EU controller or processor, which has subsidiaries in the Union, the said 
‗improvements‘ seem to bring a lot more confusion than certainty. As regards those 
entities which are not established in the EU, the situation is not a bit better since all their 
data processing activities are now potential triggers of the targeting principle to them. 
Furthermore, while broadening the scope of the GDPR application, the legislator has 
not even addressed the notions of a non-EU controller and a non-EU processor. So, the 
non-EU operators are in need of clarity with regard to all the mentioned issues. 
Being a starting point in the application of the whole GDPR in principle, Article 3 
Sections 1 and 2 have to be the first thing that the non-EU controllers and processors 
                                                          
1
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
Article 4(1) 
2
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Recital 23 
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consult
3
, because if Article 3 GDPR is not applicable to them, then it stands no reason 
checking whether they comply with the other provisions. Therefore, it is important to 
closely examine all the grounds that may invoke application of the GDPR to the non-
EU entities. 
Aiming at clarifying the criteria established in the Regulation, the European Data 
Protection Board (hereinafter – EDPB) has issued general Guidelines 3/2018 on the 
territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3)
4
, which contemplate the applicability of the 
GDPR provisions to various actors – both the EU and the non-EU ones. Despite casting 
light upon various aspects, Guidelines are abundant in inaccuracies and inconsistencies 
with the text of the Regulation. Also, they are silent about many practical moments and 
do not step aside from the straightforward scenarios. Nevertheless, they remain in fact 
the only official interpretation from the public authority on the matter at stake. 
1.2. Research aims and research question 
This study aims at, first of all, analyzing the grounds for the GDPR applicability from 
the non-EU controllers‘ and processors‘ perspective, notably, in isolation from the EU 
actors, where possible. Secondly, it intends to focus on the practical side of the matter 
by providing diverse examples of application that would allow drawing the line between 
what evidences are sufficient for the applicability of the GDPR and what are not 
weighty enough. Thirdly, the study will try to fill up the gaps that the EDPB has not 
addressed and, where possible, provide the probable solutions to the existing issues. 
Therefore, on the basis of the aforesaid, this thesis is going to answer the following 
research question: 
Under what conditions will a non-EU controller or processor be subject to the GDPR? 
1.3. Limitations of the paper 
In spite of being an attempt of considering various situations when the GDPR will apply 
to the data processing activities carried out by the non-EU controllers and processors, 
this study does not address the cases where the non-EU entities are pursued under the 
                                                          
3
 Svantesson, Dan Jerker, Territorial scope in: Kuner, Christopher – Bygrave, Lee A. – Docksey, 
Christopher (eds.), Draft commentaries on 10 GDPR articles (from Commentary on the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, OUP 2019) – non-final draft commentaries, 2019, 1-18, p. 8 
4
 European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3). 
Version 2.0, 12 November 2019 
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GDPR by virtue of public international law (Article 3(3)) since such example of 
application states the obvious and goes far beyond the scope of data protection field.  
Also, the paper covers neither the questions of transfers to the third states nor the 
enforcement issues since the said cases, though involve the non-EU controllers and 
processors, however, concern situations where the applicability of the GDPR is already 
established and uncontested.  
1.4. Research methods 
The methods used in this paper are conditional on the research question stipulated 
above. Taking into account that the legislative act underlies the whole study and serves 
as the main source of research, the doctrinal method was chosen to conduct the analysis 
of the respective provisions of the GDPR. Also, it was used to examine the case law on 
the matter and various advisory documents form the public authorities, such as 
guidelines, opinions and recommendations. 
Both core chapters of the thesis were examined following the same steps based on the 
structure of the respective parts of Article 3 GDPR. First, there was provided general 
overview of the principle laid down into the law provision and its key concepts, thereby 
introducing general theoretical background. Second step included breaking down the 
analyzable provision into as small elements as possible and examining each of them 
separately; when few elements were studied in detail, then it was possible to consider 
them in combination with each other, gradually layering new details onto them. When 
theoretical background was researched enough, practical situations were added as the 
completion phase in order to contemplate various issues of applicability to the non-EU 
entities. Thus, step by step both criteria of the GDPR applicability were examined. 
Also, the study applied interbranch legal method, particularly, in two cases: for 
comparison of the concept of establishment in data protection law and in company law, 
and for retracing interconnections of the concept of directing activities in consumer 
protection field with the concept of targeting in data protection law. 
Additionally, historical and legal method was applied in order to demonstrate the 
development of the concept of targeting within the legal doctrine, which originated from 
the context of consumer contracts in Brussels I Regulation and appear to be embedded 
nowadays in data protection field. 
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1.5. Structure of work 
The thesis consists of four main structural parts. 
Chapter I ―Introduction‖ introduces the topic to a reader and defines the problematic 
aspects that lack clarity. Also, it determines the limitations of the paper, explains the 
methods used in the research process and describes the structural components of the 
paper. Finally, in extra paragraph, it prepares reader for the main part of work by 
presenting the key notions of the study.  
The structure of thesis is conditional on the composition of the researched sections in 
Article 3 GDPR. Therefore, the pivot of work consists of just two but extensive 
chapters. 
Chapter II ―Applicability of the establishment principle (Article 3(1) GDPR)‖ examines 
what ‗being established in the Union‘ means, provides conditions for the establishment 
test, determines how to ascertain the links between an EU establishment with its non-
EU parent company, and considers various scenarios of applicability depending on the 
status of the operator. 
Chapter III ―Applicability of the targeting principle (Article 3(2) GDPR)‖ explains both 
subjective and objective constituents of the targeting criterion, specifies at what point in 
time data subjects are considered to be in the Union, provides conditions for the 
targeting test, and exemplifies which activities refer to offering of goods and services 
and which demonstrate monitoring of the data subjects‘ behaviour. 
Chapter IV ―Conclusions‖ answers the research question and summarises the findings 
and final observations.  
1.6. The notions of a non-EU controller and a non-EU processor 
For the purposes of this paper and before turning to the discussion on the matter which 
starts in the next chapter, it is utterly important to define who (or what) a non-EU 
controller and a non-EU processor stand for. This will allow setting the limits of the 
paper and distinguishing the non-EU controllers and processors from the EU ones. 
The GDPR does not provide for the definitions of either a non-EU controller or a non-
EU processor. Nevertheless, these notions are implicitly presented in the text of the 
Regulation in a somewhat different way – ―a controller or a processor not established in 
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the Union‖
5
 (emphasis added). Even though it seems obvious from the above that a non-
EU controller is a controller not established in the Union, and a non-EU processor is, 
accordingly, a processor not established in the Union, however, this needs to be further 
clarified.  
The GDPR is the European Union regulation which means that it is binding and 
directly applicable in all 27 Member States of the EU
6
. Also, starting since 20 July 
2018, it is a part of the national legal systems of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
7
 by 
virtue of the Agreement on the European Economic Area
8
 which extended the EU‘s 
single market to the non-EU member parties. The respective decision to incorporate the 
GDPR into the EEA Agreement was adopted by the EEA Joint Committee
9
. Hence, the 
GDPR is applicable not only on the territory of the EU Member States, but also on the 
territory of three more EEA states, namely Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
Therefore, even though the GDPR refers to the Union and its Member States throughout 
the text, it is necessary to bear in mind that in most cases this should be interpreted as a 
reference to the EEA states as well
10
. 
Taking into consideration the aforesaid, it is not right to assert that a non-EU controller 
or processor is just the one which is not established in the EU. Thus, similarly to how 
the GDPR defines a ‗controller‘ and a ‗processor‘
11
, it is suggested to render non-EU 
controller as the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which is 
established in the state other than the EU Member State or the EEA state
12
, and which, 
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data. By analogy, it is suggested to render non-EU processor as a natural or 
legal person, public authority, agency or other body which is established in the state 
                                                          
5
 See Recitals 23, 24, 25, 80, 122, Articles 3(2), 3(3), 27 GDPR 
6
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 
2012/C 326/01, Article 288 
7
 The European Free Trade Association. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force in 
the EEA, 19 July 2018. Available at: <www.efta.int/EEA/news/General-Data-Protection-Regulation-
GDPR-entered-force-EEA-509576> 
8
 Agreement on the European Economic Area, 13 December 1993  
9
 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 154/2018 of 6 July 2018 amending Annex XI (Electronic 
communication, audiovisual services and information society) and Protocol 37 (containing the list 
provided for in Article 101) to the EEA Agreement [2018/1022]  
10
 Granmar, Claes G. Global applicability of the GDPR in context. Available at: <www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1274839/FULLTEXT01.pdf>. 14 January 2019 – last updated, p. 3 
11
 Article 4 (7, 8) GDPR 
12
 It is not advisable to unite ‗the EU Member State‘ and ‗the EEA state‘ under the common denominator 
which is ‗the EEA states‘, though all EU Member States are also the EEA states, since such formulation 
may run counter to the scope of the GDPR as the EU regulation in the first place, and it may clash with 
the wordings used in the Regulation in the second place. 
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other than the EU Member State or the EEA state
13
, and which processes personal data 
on behalf of the controller. This way, it would be precisely ascertained that a non-EU 
controller or processor is the one established in any state, except the EU Member States 
and other three EEA states. Namely all those third states are covered by this paper.  
To avoid confusion with the wordings in the GDPR and in this thesis, the terminology 
used in the paper will be the same as in the text of the GDPR, for instance, use of ‗in the 
Union‘ and ‗Member States‘ when referring to the EU. However, at all times, this will 
implicate additionally ‗in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway‘. 
With respect to the UK and its recent withdrawal from the EU (hereinafter – Brexit) 
which took place on 31 January 2020, few points ought to be highlighted here. On the 
one hand, the GDPR is the EU regulation directly applicable to Member States of the 
EU, and since the UK has left the Union and, thus, lost the status of a Member State, so 
the Regulation should not apply to the UK anymore. If that was the case, this would 
allow rendering the UK as the third state right after Brexit. On the other hand, however, 
as the ICO stated, the GDPR will continue to apply to the UK till the end of the year 
2020 which is conditional on the transition period14. This means that since the UK keeps 
on abiding the Regulation during the transition period, it has to be regarded as though it 
was a Member State. According to the ICO, when the transition period is over, the 
GDPR will discontinue applying to the UK15. There are opposite views as to what 
happens next: the ICO considers that the Regulation will be incorporated into the UK 
law as the so-called ‗UK GDPR‘
16
; however, Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister of the 
UK, alleges that the UK will ―develop separate and independent policies‖ in various 
areas, including data protection
17
. In any case, even if the ICO is right and the GDPR 
will be incorporated into the UK legislation, this will not change the fact that the UK is 
the non-EU state. So, starting from 1 January 2021, it will be possible to affirmatively 
ascertain that the UK is the third state in relation to the EU. As it follows, all the 
respective findings of this paper will be applicable to the UK as well since the UK‘s 
controllers and processors will become the non-EU ones.   
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 Ibid 
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 The Information Commissioner‘s Office, Information rights and Brexit Frequently Asked Questions, 
29 January 2020. Available at: <www.ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/brexit/2617110/information-rights-and-brexit-faqs-v2_3.pdf>, p. 1 
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 Ibid, p. 2 
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 Ibid, p. 1 
17
 Johnson, Boris, UK / EU relations: Written statement – HCWS86 of 3 February 2020. Available at: 
<www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
statement/Commons/2020-02-03/HCWS86/> 
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II. APPLICABILITY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLE (ARTICLE 3(1) 
GDPR) 
2.1. The establishment principle 
The establishment principle is a starting point of determining whether a non-EU 
controller or processor is subject to the GDPR. Anticipating things, in case the 
establishment principle cannot be applied, the next step will be checking the 
applicability of the targeting principle
18
.   
According to the establishment principle, the choice of applicable law depends on the 
place where an entity is established
19
. It is stipulated in Article 3(1) on the territorial 
scope of the GDPR which states the following: “This Regulation applies to the 
processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a 
controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place 
in the Union or not.”
20
 As it follows, the actual place of processing activities does not 
affect the applicability of the GDPR, – instead, the location of the establishment 
matters. 
On the surface, it may seem that the provision has nothing to do with applicability to the 
non-EU based entities, and only the closing wording ‗in the Union or not‘ indicates the 
extraterritorial effect. However, the case is somewhat different. Despite its vague 
formulation, the provision foresees a broad scope of possible subjects, including, but not 
limited to, the non-EU subjects, i. e., the non-EU controllers and processors. Notably, 
Article 3(1) GDPR in the first place is oriented towards the EU entities, and only after 
closer consideration it appears to be a comprehensive provision encompassing the EU 
based as well as the non-EU based entities. 
In order to apply the establishment principle, it is necessary, first, to determine whether 
a non-EU controller or processor is established through an establishment in the Union, 
and, second, to check whether the personal data is processed in the context of the 
activities of the said EU establishment. So, following this order, the questions will be 
contemplated in detail hereinafter. 
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 See Chapter III. Applicability of the targeting principle (Article 3(2) GDPR) 
19
 Voigt, Paul – von dem Bussche, Axel, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A 
Practical Guide. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2017, p. 24 
20
 Article 3(1) GDPR 
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2.2. An establishment of a non-EU controller or processor in the Union 
2.2.1. Types of connections between controllers, processors and their 
establishments 
Before considering under what conditions a non-EU legal entity will have an 
establishment in the Union, it is necessary to inquire into theoretical part as to what 
kinds of connections may occur between establishments and their parent companies. 
In general, a controller or a processor may have one, several or many establishments, or 
no establishment. To be more precise, in the latter case, both notions coincide since a 
company appears as an establishment in relation to itself. For the purposes of this 
chapter, only instances with at least two establishments are of interest – when one 
establishment is outside the EU and another one is within the EU.  
The main company (more common ‗parent company‘ or ‗parent firm‘) is at the same 
time the ‗main establishment‘ (or ‗primary establishment‘), while its subsidiary 
companies (‗subsidiaries‘ or ‗daughter companies‘) are ‗secondary establishments‘ (or 
‗affiliated establishments‘). So, in order to stipulate that a non-EU entity has an 
establishment in the Union, there has to be the following arrangement of facts: the main 
establishment is in the non-EU state, and the affiliated establishment is in the EU 
Member State. If, for instance, the situation is vice versa, i. e., the primary 
establishment is in the Union and the secondary establishment is in the third state, then 
the given example concerns the EU parent company which has an affiliated 
establishment in the third state. Of course, the GDPR applies to such situation, however, 
that is not covered by this paper. 
A good example of the right arrangement of facts for the application of Article 3(1) 
GDPR can be found in the real case. On July 9 2019, the UK Information 
Commissioner‘s Office (ICO) announced about its intention to impose a fine in the 
amount of £99,200,396 against Marriott International, Inc. for violation of the GDPR
21
. 
The case concerned the cyber incident during which guest records related to residents of 
all EEA states were exposed
22
. Despite the fact that Marriott International, Inc. was 
headquartered in the United States, the said data breach fell under the GDPR since the 
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 The Information Commissioner‘s Office, Intention to fine Marriott International, Inc. more than £99 
million under GDPR for data breach, 9 July 2019. Available at: <www.ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-
and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/intention-to-fine-marriott-international-inc-more-than-99-million-
under-gdpr-for-data-breach/> 
22
 Ibid 
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company was established in the Union as well through its office in the UK
23
 (at that 
time – the EU Member State). Therefore, the establishment principle applied. 
An establishment of 
Article 3(1) GDPR prescribes that an establishment concerned has to be an 
establishment of either a controller or a processor in the Union
24
. Granmar suggests 
interpreting the provision in question on the basis of its literal construction and therefore 
considers that, in the event of a non-EU entity, ‗an establishment of‘ will be the non-EU 
controller‘s or processor‘s affiliated person in the Union
25
. Moreover, elaborating on 
this suggestion, the scholar states that if the processing is conducted in the context of 
the activities of an undertaking which belongs to the same group of undertakings as a 
non-EU entity, the GDPR will not apply since in this case the undertaking will not be 
considered the non-EU entity‘s establishment
26
. So, according to Granmar, ‗an 
establishment of‘ should indicate the relationship of belonging to or possession of the 
non-EU entity. 
However, such a literal construction is too narrow and does not reflect the real meaning 
of the provision. As it is shown hereinafter in paragraph 2.5.4 of the paper, under certain 
circumstances, a processor in the EU may be regarded as an establishment of a non-EU 
controller. That is to say, despite the fact that there are two separate entities in question, 
the establishment of one company may be considered as an establishment of another. 
Thus, ‗an establishment of‘ indicates rather a certain connection between two parties 
than the fact of belonging one to another. 
2.2.2. The concept of establishment 
Indubitably, ‗establishment‘ is a central notion in the whole Article 3 GDPR since it 
defines the scope of territorial approach of the Regulation. Despite the notion‘s 
significance, the GDPR does not provide for a definition of ‗establishment‘ specifically 
for the goals of Article 3 GDPR and, moreover, does not include it into the ‗Definitions‘ 
section, however, places it into recitals in the preamble to the GDPR. On the one hand, 
such approach to composing a legislative act is not surprising since both the same 
definition and placement in the document were in the DPD, and the GDPR repeats its 
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 Marriott International headquarters and office locations. Available at: <www.craft.co/marriot-
international/locations> 
24
 Article 3(1) GDPR 
25
 Granmar 2019, p. 27 
26
 Ibid 
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predecessor in much. On the other hand, taking into consideration how much the 
legislator has enlarged the ‗Definitions‘ section of the GDPR in comparison with the 
DPD, and how important the scope of establishment is for the application of the whole 
Regulation, it seems unreasonable to leave the definition of establishment in recitals 
again.  
Though, here is how recital 22 in the preamble to the GDPR construes it: 
“[e]stablishment implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable 
arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a 
subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in that respect.”
27
 That 
is to say, a non-EU controller or processor will be considered to have an establishment 
in the Union, if it exercises on the territory of the Union an effective and real activity 
through stable arrangements, regardless of its legal form. Supposedly, all the mentioned 
conditions are met, and a non-EU controller or processor has an establishment in the 
Union, in that case, as a general rule, it will be pursued under Article 3(1) GDPR. 
The CJEU in its judgments has helpfully interpreted the notion of ‗establishment‘ 
within the meaning of EU data protection law. This is particularly important since not 
every notion of ‗establishment‘ can be applicable here due to being different in other 
branches of law (for instance, company law), or in standard practice when a company is 
established there where it is physically headquartered
28
. Nevertheless, it should be 
observed that the notion of ‗establishment‘ within the meaning of EU data protection 
law originates from the general definition of ‗establishment‘ and has adopted ―stable 
and continuous basis‖ of activity
29
 from it. 
The case law of the CJEU on the aforesaid matter is based on the interpretations of the 
DPD, thus, can be applied to the GDPR respectively. For instance, in Weltimmo case, 
the Court concluded that the concept of establishment is flexible and must be interpreted 
apart from a formalistic approach, according to which entities are considered to be 
established only in the place of registration
30
. Indeed, in a modern information world, 
such formalities as registration of a branch play minor role; on the contrary, the real 
                                                          
27
 Recital 22 GDPR  
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 Meisinger, Jeremy, Weltimmo v. Hungarian Data Protection Authority: EU Rules on What It Means To 
Be ―Established‖ in a Jurisdiction, 2 December 2015. Available at: 
<www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2015/12/weltimmo-v-hungarian-data-protection-authority-eu-rules-
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 CJEU, Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano, 30 November 1995, para 25 
30
 CJEU, Case C-230/14, Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság,        
1 October 2015, para 29 
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activities of a branch and their factual effects matter. Thus, lack of a registered office in 
the Union does not preclude a non-EU entity from having an establishment there within 
the meaning of EU data protection law. Upon reversion, the place of registration does 
not necessarily mean the same as the place of establishment, though usually serves an 
indicator for an establishment
31
. For example, in Weltimmo case, the company was 
registered in Slovakia, however, the Court ruled that it was actually established in 
Hungary due to conducting business activities there
32
. Thus, it is possible that a non-EU 
company can have a formally registered branch in the Union, however, that branch will 
not be considered an establishment within the meaning of EU data protection law. All 
the above illustrated mismatches happen due to the prevailing role of the real activities 
(will be discussed in paragraph 2.2.5 of the paper further) which exactly determine the 
establishment. 
While the CJEU has fixed that the notion of ‗establishment‘ is broad
33
 and flexible
34
, 
and in every case it adheres to this opinion by means of providing more and more all-
embracing meaning of the notion, the EDPB warns that interpretation of ‗establishment‘ 
cannot be boundless
35
. For instance, a non-EU entity cannot be admitted to have an 
establishment in the Union based solely on the fact that its website can be accessed from 
one of the Member States
36
. Indeed, accessibility of the website is just an attainment of 
the digital age – everyone who has access to the Internet can normally reach any web-
page (with the exception of some restrictions). Quite another situation will be if a non-
EU entity purposefully targets the EU data subjects through its website
37
, – then the 
accessibility of the latter has to be evaluated in connection with other facts of the case. 
However, in any event, mere accessibility of the website from the Union cannot lead to 
an establishment per se. 
2.2.3. The establishment test 
In order to determine whether a non-EU controller or processor has an establishment in 
the Union, it is necessary to apply the establishment criteria, i. e., the stability of the 
arrangements and the real and effective exercise of activities in the Union
38
. 
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Additionally, as Advocate General Villalόn noted in his Opinion in Weltimmo case, and 
later it was supported by the Court, the establishment criteria ―must be interpreted in the 
light of the specific nature of the economic activities and the provision of services 
concerned‖
39
, especially when the entity in question provides services only on the 
Internet
40
. Thus, the establishment test offered by the Court consists of the following 
steps:  
1) determining whether an activity is executed through stable arrangements;  
2) determining whether the activity is real and effective;  
3) evaluating the activity in the light of its nature and the services provided.  
It is worth noting that in its Guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR, the EDPB 
emphasizes on the need to determine an establishment in the Union on a case-by-case 
basis and to take into consideration the specific facts of the case
41
. Such a vague in its 
wording advice, on the one hand, does not provide for the concrete guidance, however, 
on the other hand, leaves room for analysis and warns that there are no straightforward 
answers yet. 
Nevertheless, this paper will follow the existing establishment test as it is. So, when all 
three steps are done, questions are answered in the affirmative and the specific details of 
the case are taken into account, then it is possible to consider that a non-EU controller 
or processor has an establishment in the Union. The above specified steps are examined 
in the next paragraphs. 
2.2.4. Stable arrangements 
In an establishment, activities are carried out through stable arrangements. The legal 
form of arrangements is not decisive in respect to the application of the establishment 
criteria
42
, – the legislator stipulates that directly and defines stability as a determinant 
factor instead. In essence, whatever to call a non-EU entity‘s establishment on the 
territory of the Union, – whether a branch, an office or a subsidiary, – it will, in any 
case, represent its non-EU parent company in the Union, and, in that sense, this is 
enough to show a link between the establishment in the Union and the non-EU parent 
company. It is important to note that an establishment does not necessarily need to have 
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a legal personality
43
, which allows applying the broad concept of establishment – the 
non-formalistic one. 
Supposedly, a non-EU controller or processor decided not to have an establishment in 
the Union in order to avoid applicability of the GDPR to its processing activities, – it 
simply does not establish a branch nor a subsidiary company in any of the Member 
States and believes that this way it is not pursued under the GDPR. However, lack of a 
formally established, i. e., registered, arrangement, as shown in paragraph 2.2.2 of the 
paper hereinbefore, does not exclude the existence of an establishment in the Union in 
terms of EU data protection law
44
. Moreover, whether a non-EU entity considers itself 
being established within the Union or not, is not decisive in that respect.  
Quite another situation would be if a non-EU entity indeed does not have any stable 
arrangement or representation in the Union, – neither registered, nor factual, – that 
potentially could be considered as its establishment. In such case, there would be no 
grounds for the application of establishment principle. 
Notably, an employee or an agent of a non-EU entity does not necessarily have to 
originate from the third state where the main establishment is in order to be considered 
its establishment in the Union; rather, it can be any resident or company from the Union 
which was hired specifically for the purposes of the non-EU main establishment. For 
instance, this will be the case when, as shown hereinafter in paragraph 2.5.4 of the 
paper, an EU-based processor may be considered as an establishment of a non-EU 
controller in the Union. Furthermore, even having an appointed consultant in the Union 
may lead to a full-fledged establishment there with all respectful consequences
45
.  
Stability of the arrangements 
Arrangements must be stable – that is what the legislator alleges, however, how to 
measure stability remains unclear. Some guidance on this issue is found in Gebhard 
case, in which the Court ruled that the activity has to be evaluated in the light of, first of 
all, its duration and, second, with regard to ―its regularity, periodicity and continuity‖
46
. 
According to Villalόn, the key feature of the stable arrangements is ―a factor of 
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permanence‖
47
. Therefore, putting altogether the listed interpretations, it is possible to 
infer that the regular activities performed through the arrangements on a continuous and 
permanent basis, without specified time frame, confirm the stability of arrangements. 
By contrast, limited period of performance indicates rather a service than a stable 
activity
48
.  
As Korff rightly observed, ―a travelling person is unlikely to constitute an 
―establishment‖‖
49
. This example pictures to oneself an agent of a foreign company who 
travels around the EU in InterCity trains and advertises to passengers some goods or 
services that his or her company provides and, at the same time, the agent collects the 
contact details of the passengers in order to monthly send them the company‘s 
newsletters. It is not that a person cannot be considered an establishment, – on the 
contrary, this is quite possible. However, the problem with a travelling agent lays in 
arrangement being not stable a priori, at least on the basis that it does not have a fixed 
location.  
Regarding the degree of stability, it has to be estimated, first, in view of the nature of an 
arrangement‘s economic activities and, second, the services provided by that 
arrangement
50
. Voigt has provided an example showing that when a non-EU entity‘s 
office in the Union ―develops customer relationships‖, it is deemed to have ―a 
considerable degree of stability that qualifies the office as ‗establishment‘‖
51
. Why in 
the exemplified instance the activity was understood to have a considerable degree of 
stability, remains unclear, though. The problem is that there is no unambiguous answer 
regarding under what circumstances certain activities are stable enough and on which 
conditions they are insufficient. The EDPB seems to ensure oneself against any risks 
and did not take care of drawing a borderline between ‗sufficient‘ and ‗insufficient‘ 
stability. Probably, the reason for that is, broadly speaking, that stability is always 
relative: what is sufficiently stable in one case, might be not stable enough to be 
rendered establishment in another. Until there is the case law with striking examples 
which clearly illustrate when stability is rendered ‗sufficient‘ or ‗insufficient‘, its real 
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meaning will remain a riddle. So, for the time being, there is no other better guidance 
than that the degree of stability always has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Returning to the nature of activities, they can, roughly speaking, be divided into offline 
and online activities. For both types, the activity must contribute to the data processing. 
In case of the offline activities, everything is more or less clear since the existence of an 
arrangement is real and obvious: usually, there is a physical location of an 
establishment through an office or a branch, a post address, the representatives and so 
forth. The situation is different when online activities are in question. Then a ‗burden of 
proof‘ depends on the circumstances of the case, and, as stated hereinbefore, there is no 
clear algorithm for determining the degree of stability.  
Provision of services online 
The EDPB has extended the concept of establishment for online organisations even 
further in comparison with the existing case law on the matter by stating that when it 
comes to such an activity as the provision of services online, ―the threshold for ―stable 
arrangement‖ can actually be quite low‖
52
. Providing services over the Internet excepts 
some features attributable to an establishment in its typical image, for instance, real 
estate, infrastructure, assets, representatives etc. – some of them can be missing since 
they do not have an influence on the effective provision of services online. 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (hereinafter – WP29) considers the 
definition of ‗established service provider‘ relevant for the purposes of data protection 
law
53
. Thus, according to recital 19 in the preamble to Directive on electronic 
commerce, ―the place of establishment of a company providing services via an Internet 
website is not the place at which the technology supporting its website is located or the 
place at which its website is accessible but the place where it pursues its economic 
activity‖
54
 (emphasis added). Basically, this means that if an arrangement of a non-EU 
controller or processor offers services exclusively on the Internet and it offers or 
administrates its services in the Union, the arrangement can amount to an 
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‗establishment‘
55
. In support of the above specified definition, the WP29 clarifies that 
the fact of using the web servers located in place ‗A‘ does not change the fact that a 
company is still established in place ‗B‘ where it conducts the activities or where it is 
registered
56
. Furthermore, as already discussed hereinabove, a non-EU controller or 
processor cannot be considered to have an establishment in the Union merely in terms 
of the fact that its website is accessible from one of the Member States
57
. Therefore, 
indeed, the place where a non-EU company providing services via the Internet pursues 
its economic activities will define its stable arrangements there and, thus, the 
establishment.  
On 21 January 2019, the Restricted Committee of the CNIL (Commission Nationale de 
l‘Informatique et des Libertés – the French Data Protection Authority) issued the 
heaviest GDPR sanction so far – a 50 million euros fine against Google LLC for 
violating the GDPR, notably, for lack of transparency, information and effective 
consent
58
. According to the facts of the case, Google LLC is a company with a 
registered office in the United States, and one of its subsidiaries is based in France – 
Google France SARL
59
. Thus, the latter appears as the establishment of the Google LLC 
in the Union. Formally, that is so, however, as specified above, the company providing 
services over the Internet is established there where it pursues economic activity. In this 
context, it is worth mentioning that Google has developed, inter alia, the operating 
system for Android mobile terminals which numbered 27 million users in France
60
. This 
allows the conclusion that Google pursued economic activities through its French 
subsidiary, therefore, the given fact defines France as the place of establishment of the 
Google‟s EU subsidiary. 
Another striking example concerns a series of complaints filed against big corporations 
that provide streaming services, four of which are headquartered in the United States. 
They are Amazon, Apple, Netflix and YouTube. The said complaints were filed on 18 
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January 2019 by noyb (―none of your business‖) – a European non-profit organisation 
for privacy enforcement
61
. It accused the said companies of violation of the right of 
access guaranteed by the GDPR. So far as the streaming companies have the European 
subsidiaries in the Member States – Amazon in Luxembourg
62
, Apple in the Republic of 
Ireland
63
, Netflix in the Netherlands
64
 and YouTube in Austria
65
 (due to Google LLC 
being YouTube‟s parent company) – the complaints were submitted against the 
respectful European establishments. Even though the complaints are currently under 
investigation, there is no doubt that the said companies administrate the services of their 
US parent companies in the Union and therefore are established in the EU within data 
protection law. Thereby this makes filing of the complaints against them possible under 
the GDPR.  
It would be unreasonable with respect to the provision of services online not to 
contemplate the issue of whether a website would qualify as a stable arrangement
66
. So, 
to answer this question, it is necessary again to appeal to the Directive on electronic 
commerce. It directly stipulates that ―[t]he presence and use of the technical means and 
technologies required to provide the service do not, in themselves, constitute an 
establishment of the provider‖
67
. As it follows, even though being to some extent 
relevant to the technological constituent of a service provider, a website itself cannot be 
considered as the stable arrangements. Moreover, as it was noted above, the place of 
establishment of a service provider ―is not the place at which the technology supporting 
its website is located‖
68
. Putting Ustaran‘s observation into the context of the paper
69
, it 
is possible to infer that a non-EU entity with a website in the Union, however, pursuing 
its economic activity in, e. g., Belarus, will not be pursued under the GDPR since it will 
not be established in the Union within the meaning of data protection law. 
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Bygrave confirmed the view that a website is unlikely to qualify a stable arrangement, 
nevertheless, as the scholar noted, it would be quite possible to prove the execution of 
real and effective activities of an establishment by means of a website, if the latter is 
interactive
70
. This way, it is clear that a website as such has a dual nature – on the one 
hand, it cannot be singled out as a separate stable arrangement, however, on the other 
hand, an establishment becomes established through the mentioned website. The logic 
behind this is comprehensible, i. e., why a website cannot be considered as a stable 
arrangement as such. However, the whole confusion sits uncomfortably with the 
concept of establishment. 
Some light on the stated issue was cast by Granmar. He has defined the situation which 
occurred in Weltimmo case as the recognition of ―a composite establishment consisting 
of the online presence […] and a stable offline arrangement through an appointed 
representative‖
71
. Thus, in this example, the website was considered the argument of 
Weltimmo pursuing economic activities in Hungary. However, only the representative 
qualified to a stable arrangement. 
Through stable arrangements 
It is worth noting that the wording ‗through stable arrangements‘ was framed so not 
without purpose. Basically, it stipulates that a non-EU controller or processor is 
established in the Union by the use of its stable arrangements and exercises activity 
there also by the use of its stable arrangements. So, stable arrangements appear as the 
means. Of course, they can have a legal form of a branch, a subsidiary etc. However, if 
that branch or subsidiary does not serve as the means (e. g., appears as a controlled 
undertaking, instead) for the non-EU parent company for the purpose of fulfilling the 
above mentioned tasks, or, moreover, if it does not contribute to the processing of 
personal data, then it will not be considered an establishment in the Union, at least 
within the meaning of data protection law. Therefore, ‗to be established in the Union 
through stable arrangements‘ and ‗to have a controlled undertaking in the Union‘ is not 
the same
72
. 
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Human and material resources 
In the case law of the CJEU, there was repeatedly confirmed
73
 that a stable arrangement 
envisages that ―both the human and technical resources necessary for the provision of 
the services are permanently present‖
74
. Now, when a non-formalistic approach of 
determining the place of establishment is admitted as a guiding star, the human and 
technical resources go yet a greater way. 
The WP29 has provided felicitous practical examples of resources that can constitute 
stable arrangements. It has given an opinion that when effective and real activities take 
place in an office, the latter will be deemed material resource through which the 
establishment operates. Even in case of a one-person office, it will still qualify as a 
resource since the office is ―actively involved in the activities in the context of which 
the processing of personal data takes place‖; and such involvement goes beyond just a 
representative function.
75
 It is right that quantitative aspects, such as how many 
employees are appointed to an EU establishment, do not affect applicability of the 
establishment principle. 
As for other material resources, the WP29 has clarified that a server or a computer 
cannot be considered as an establishment, arguing that they are just instruments for data 
processing
76
. They are. However, Advocate General Villalόn thinks somewhat 
differently about that. He states that ―[i]n some circumstances, an agent who is 
permanently present, equipped with little more than a laptop computer‖, can be deemed 
acting with a sufficient degree of stability
77
. Admittedly, by stating that, he meant a 
person whose equipment and probably software go beyond an average user‘s computer. 
On condition that a computer is not the only resource being assessed in the context of 
availability of stable arrangements, it is possible to infer that a computer (or any other 
data processing equipment) can actually lead to a stable arrangement. The essential 
takeaway here is that there must be a combination of both human and material resources 
presented – the computer needs to be operated by someone. Regarding the 
abovementioned ‗some circumstances‘, Villalόn emphasizes that, when evaluating 
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human and technical resources, it is necessary to consider peculiarities of legal entities 
offering services on the Internet and undertake in concreto analysis of each situation.
78
 
Besides technical resources which are directly involved in the processing activities of 
personal data, there are some other examples of material resources found in the case 
law. For instance, in Weltimmo case, a letter box and a bank account in Hungary were, 
indubitably, regarded as the material resources, even though the Court did not state that 
directly
79
. Together with the legal representative who was the human resource, the letter 
box and the bank account constituted the stable arrangements of Weltimmo in Hungary 
and, thus, the establishment there.   
Representative as a stable arrangement 
As shown above, a representative should be qualified as the human resources. 
Developing this consideration, the WP29 has specified that ―even a simple agent may 
be considered as a relevant establishment if his presence in the Member State presents 
sufficient stability‖
80
. That is to say, the actual position in the company of a 
representative is not decisive – the idea is that such a person has to represent the non-
EU controller or processor in the EU. Villalόn supported the statement and added that a 
sole agent‘s stability has to be assured by ―the presence of the human and technical 
resources necessary for the provision of the specific services concerned‖
81
. This way, it 
is once again confirmed the unity of the human and material (technical) resources 
required for the ascertainment of stable arrangements. 
The dual meaning of a „representative‟ 
There is an issue with the dual meaning of a ‗representative‘ in the context of 
interpretation of the Regulation. The difference is considerable for the right applicability 
of the GDPR. That is why it will be contemplated here in detail. 
According to the meaning introduced in the Regulation, ‗representative‘ is a natural or 
legal person established in the Union and designated by the non-EU controller or 
processor in writing
82
 in cases specified in Article 3(2) GDPR
83
, i. e., targeting or 
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monitoring of data subjects in the Union. So, this kind of a ‗representative‘ is a specially 
appointed one in the precisely defined by the GDPR cases.  
The other ‗representative‘ is, roughly speaking, a factual representative that does not 
necessarily have to be designated in writing, and such a person is a representative by 
virtue of executed duties. The person in question may be an agent of the non-EU entity, 
its employee, consultant etc., who de facto, inter alia, represents the non-EU controller 
or processor on the territory of the EU. That was the case in Weltimmo, where the 
representative Mr Benkö served as a point of contact between the data subjects and the 
company, as well as he represented the company in the judicial and administrative 
proceedings
84
. The CJEU found those facts the satisfactory evidence and ruled that even 
the presence of one representative may be sufficient to form a stable arrangement
85
. The 
EDPB confirmed this, observing that the availability of at least one employee or agent 
of the non-EU controller or processor in the Union may be equated to a stable 
arrangement on condition that there is a ―sufficient degree of stability‖ in that 
employee‘s or agent‘s actions
86
. Hence, a representative may lead to a stable 
arrangement and, thus, to an establishment of the non-EU entity.  
Following the logic, the representative within the meaning of Article 4(17) GDPR might 
constitute a stable arrangement as well. Gömann claims that the requirement to appoint 
a representative, in accordance with Article 27 GDPR, might lead to a stable 
arrangement, which, in turn, would trigger the establishment clause of Article 3(1) 
GDPR so that the latter would be ―likely to even absorb the remaining field of 
application of the two alternatives posed under Article 3(2)‖
87
. However, that is not the 
case.  
Anticipating the forthcoming issues with wrong interpretation and, thus, application of 
the concept of representative, the EDPB warned that a representative designated 
pursuant to Article 27 GDPR ―does not constitute an ―establishment‖ of a controller or 
processor by virtue of article 3(1)‖
88
 (emphasis added). In practice, this means that the 
presence in the Union of a representative appointed on the basis of Article 27 GDPR 
cannot be used in proving the existence of a stable arrangement and, consequently, an 
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EU establishment of the non-EU controller or processor. The reason is obvious: if it 
could be used so, then there would be a great deal of confusion since every time when a 
representative would be designated by virtue of Article 27 GDPR, this would lead to an 
establishment in the EU and, hence, to the application of Article 3(1) GDPR instead of 
Article 3(2) GDPR, which, in turn, would make the existence of the latter pointless. 
2.2.5. The effective and real exercise of activity 
The CJEU has ruled that the notion of ‗establishment‘ ―extends to any real and effective 
activity – even a minimal one – exercised through stable arrangements‖
89
 (emphasis 
added). It came to such a conclusion in Weltimmo case, which dealt, in particular, with 
determining the meaning of ‗establishment‘. Many facts of the case allow ascertaining 
what kinds of activities may speak in favour of the real and effective activities, in other 
words, which facts may prove the affirmative of an establishment. Of course, the case 
does not cover all possible scenarios that may occur, however, provides a useful 
interpretation of the concept of establishment in practice. Since the case abounds in 
important and influencing details, it will be closely contemplated here.  
In the case, Weltimmo s. r. o. was a company registered in Slovakia, thus, it was 
established there within the meaning of company law, however, as shown hereinbefore, 
this is not the same as to be established within the meaning of data protection law. 
Despite having a registered office in Slovakia, Weltimmo did not conduct any activities 
there – it ran a business only in Hungary. The fact that the company had never engaged 
in business activities in the place of registration may indicate that it was ab origin set up 
to run a business in another state
90
. Probably, that was the case in Weltimmo, 
nevertheless, the motives are not decisive here. Thus, being a Slovak company 
registered in Slovakia within the meaning of company law was, in fact, the only 
connecting link between Weltimmo and Slovakia. 
The rest of the facts confirm Weltimmo‟s strong ties with Hungary. Firstly, as 
mentioned above, Weltimmo ran its business in Hungary, i. e., the activities took place 
there, not in Slovakia. Secondly, the company executed the activities through the 
websites which dealt exclusively with Hungarian properties. That is to say, activities 
were expressly oriented to the Hungarian market. The company conducted processing of 
personal data relating to the property‘s owners and published such data on its websites 
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in the form of advertisements. The latter were subject to fees after one month of 
publication. The language of the websites was Hungarian which indicates that the 
service addressed the customers in Hungary. The facts of the case do not provide the 
information about the extension of the domain names used for Weltimmo‟s websites to 
run. This could serve as one more link either to the activities in Hungary, if an extension 
was ―.hu‖, or to the activities in Slovakia, if it was ―.sk‖. At any rate, the language of 
the website is a more important determinant, and in the analysed case it was Hungarian. 
Thirdly, one of the owners of Weltimmo resided in Hungary and was at the same time 
the company‘s representative on the territory of Hungary. The representative served as a 
contact point between Weltimmo and customers, administered recovering debts from 
clients and introduced the company in the legal matters, in other words, fulfilled all 
range of functions that representatives normally do. Also, the representative had an 
address in Hungary, as the register of companies proved. Fourthly, Weltimmo had a post 
box in Hungary for company‘s business purposes and opened a bank account for 
managing debts collection. Such a customer-oriented approach is an additional evidence 
that Weltimmo, bag and baggage, functioned in Hungary.
91
 
It follows from all the aforesaid that Weltimmo had a comparatively weak connection 
with Slovakia and, by contrast, conducted its activities in Hungary. The CJEU singled 
out particularly few arguments as the weightiest ones: running the property dealing 
websites regarding properties in Hungary, the use of Hungarian as the language of the 
websites and fees applicable to advertisements after one month
92
. The Court concluded 
that the named factors constituted the effectiveness and real exercise of activities by 
Weltimmo, so far as the activities were ―mainly or entirely directed‖ at Hungary
93
. The 
point is that in order to be considered real and effective, the activities must contribute to 
data processing and occur in the place of stable arrangements (in this case, in Hungary) 
so that altogether to constitute an establishment there. The same rule applies to the 
establishments in the Union of the non-EU entities. 
Granmar noted that the ―Court seems to suggest that all kinds of economic activities in 
relation to a business constitute a ―real and effective activity‖ of a controller running a 
website‖
94
. It is difficult to say, how the Court would rule, if there were another 
circumstances of the case. Most likely, practically any kind of activities exercised in an 
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establishment may be considered as related to the activities of the parent company, 
especially when a local establishment serves as a link between the customers, i. e., data 
subjects, and the main establishment – the data controller.  
Notably, the threshold for activity can be quite low. The wording ―even a minimal one‖ 
allows admitting that the mere running of the website in the context of the activities of 
an establishment, as that was the case in Weltimmo, may suffice to conclude 
effectiveness and real exercise of activities. There are no limitations as to what can 
assert the real and effective activity of an establishment. Generally speaking, it can be 
everything which either confirms or refutes the existence of certain facts. In that respect, 
Weltimmo is just an example of what circumstances of the case may be taken into 
consideration when ascertaining the existence of an establishment. 
As Wisman has noted, obviously, the addressed population – people residing in 
Hungary – was decisive in the given example
95
. The formulation ‗real and effective‘ 
itself provides for an activity that creates tangible consequences from a legal 
perspective, is capable of producing a result and changing the rights and obligations of 
subjects. So, in order to be real and effective, the activity needs to influence the legal 
reality and to have an object, for instance, in the case in point, the Hungarian 
population. 
With respect to a representative, a post box and a bank account in Hungary, they were, 
indubitably, regarded as the affirmative of stable arrangements in Hungary, even though 
the Court did not state that directly. In a stable arrangement, they appear as the 
resources: a representative is a human resource and a post box and a bank account are 
material resources of an entity. The named examples of stable arrangements cannot be 
used separately in confirmation of real and effective exercise of activities since they are 
not actions as such, though are always in a close connection with the latter ones; they 
are instruments by means of which the activities become real and effective. For 
example, a bank account itself does not create any legal consequences, however, when it 
is used as an instrument for recovering debts from customers, the bank operations occur. 
The same logic applies to having a representative, a post box etc. – they may serve as 
the means of activities only when they are used in a respective way that makes activities 
happen. 
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Advocate General Villalόn noted in his Opinion that there are also other factors which 
may indicate the real and effective nature of the activities, namely, ―the place from 
where the data was uploaded, the nationality of the data subjects, the place of residence 
of the owners of the undertaking responsible for the data processing, and the fact that 
the service provided by that data controller is directed at the territory of another 
Member State‖
96
. However, the Court ruled clearly that the nationality of the data 
subjects is irrelevant
97
, and the given principle was specified in the GDPR
98
. So, as a 
matter of fact, the nationality of the data subjects cannot be of consequence for the 
purposes of determining the real and effective activities and an establishment in whole. 
As regards the other listed probable factors, they truly may indicate the real and 
effective nature of the activities of a non-EU entity‘s establishment, if taken into 
account together with other circumstances of the case. 
Granmar disagreed with the Court‘s judgment by arguing that since the legal 
representative ―was not involved in the company‘s core business‖, and he ―did not assist 
the Slovak client to provide online advertisements for real estate in Hungary‖, 
Weltimmo cannot be considered conducting the real and effective activity in Hungary 
through its representative
99
. There is some kernel of good sense in Granmar‘s argument. 
Assuming he meant that the representative fulfilled, though related, but not the same 
tasks, as the data controller in Slovakia, thus, representation ‗through‘ could not occur. 
However, it seems unreasonable that the representative was supposed to exercise 
identical functions since his tasks were ab origin different from the data controller‘s 
ones. Moreover, the representative actually contributed to the activities of the data 
controller. The Court has established that the representative was ―responsible for 
recovering the debts resulting from that activity and for representing the controller in 
the administrative and judicial proceedings relating to the processing of the data 
concerned‖
100
 (emphases added). So, undoubtedly, the activities exercised by the 
representative, in particular, contributed to the company‘s core business substantially 
enough to conclude that the real and effective activities were carried out in Hungary. 
The most important takeaway here is that the activities exercised in an establishment in 
the Union must be related to the data processing activities of the parent company. The 
                                                          
96
 Opinion of Advocate General Villalόn, paras 42, 72(1) 
97
 Weltimmo case, para 66(1) 
98
 Recitals 2, 14 GDPR 
99
 Granmar 2019, p. 31 
100
 Weltimmo case, para 66(1) 
26 
 
issue of this relatedness is contemplated in more detail in section 2.3 of the paper 
hereinafter. 
To sum up the outcome of Weltimmo case at this point, the Court established that 
Weltimmo executed the real and effective exercise of activities, and those activities were 
exercised by means of stable arrangements. Also, it took into account that the activities 
in question were conducted through the websites, thus, the entity provided services over 
the Internet. Finally, the Court came to a conclusion that overall this ascertains the 
existence of Weltimmo‟s establishment in Hungary within the meaning of data 
protection law
101
. This way, the Court demonstrated how the establishment test can be 
met and created the precedent for EU businesses, as well as non-EU businesses which 
process personal data. 
2.3. Processing in the context of the activities of an EU establishment 
2.3.1. Applicability of the concept of processing in the context of the activities of an 
EU establishment 
When the establishment test is checked, and it is confirmed that a non-EU controller or 
processor has an establishment which exercises real and effective activity through stable 
arrangements in the Union, then it is possible to proceed to the next step – checking 
whether the personal data is processed in the context of the activities of the said EU 
establishment
102
. Thereby it will be determined whether Article 3(1) GDPR can be 
applied. Anticipating things, it is important to note that if a non-EU entity has an 
establishment in the Union, however, does not carry out processing in the context of the 
activities of that establishment, Article 3(1) GDPR will not apply to such processing
103
. 
According to recital 22 in the preamble to the GDPR, the Regulation applies to any 
processing that is performed in the context of the activities of the respective 
establishment
104
. The GDPR itself does not provide any clues as to how to define when 
the processing takes place ‗in the context of‘ and not otherwise. In this respect, Jay 
suggests undertaking analysis of ―the nature of the activities which are directed from the 
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establishment and the relationship of those activities with the relevant processing in 
question‖
105
. 
A non-EU controller or processor will be subject to the GDPR every time when the 
processing is performed in the context of the activities of its respective 
establishments
106
. As Jay specified regarding particularly a controller, it will continue to 
be responsible ―even if the actual processing is conducted by a processor and/or takes 
place elsewhere‖
107
. On the surface, it may seem that a non-EU controller bears more 
responsibility than a processor, however, obviously, the aforementioned observation 
derives from the controlling and organizational nature of a controller and from the fact 
that a processor acts ―on behalf of the controller‖
108
. 
As it follows from the case law on the matter, the wording ‗in the context of the 
activities of an establishment‘ cannot be construed restrictively
109
. Therefore, it is not 
possible to conclude that the concept at stake, for instance, equates to ‗processing within 
the activities of an establishment‘
110
, or to apply it merely ―to the specific business 
model of search engine operators‖
111
, as it was in Google Spain case. At the same time, 
it would be wrong to construe the concept too broadly and infer that any establishment 
in the Union, even the one having ―the remotest links to the data processing activities‖ 
of a non-EU controller or processor, will invoke the application of Article 3(1) GDPR to 
that processing
112
. Elaborating on this statement, the EDPB reiterates the WP29
113
 and 
clarifies that ―some commercial activity‖ carried out by a non-EU controller or 
processor in the Union may be outside the scope of the processing of personal data by 
this entity
114
. Indeed, commercial activities do not necessarily embody data processing 
activities, which, in turn, means that those commercial activities are not done in the 
context of data processing. In such case, they cannot be deemed as covered by data 
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protection law. Therefore, with respect to data processing activities, they should be 
considered separately from the commercial activities. 
2.3.2. Role of an EU establishment in the data processing 
The processing in the context of the activities of an EU establishment can, generally 
speaking, occur in two cases: first, if the relevant data processing is being done by the 
EU establishment itself, or, second, if ―the establishment is otherwise ‗inextricably 
linked‘‖ to the personal data processing activities of the non-EU parent entity
115
. So, the 
applicability of the ‗in the context of‘ criterion depends on the role which an EU 
establishment plays in the data processing. 
In the first case, when an EU establishment carries out processing of personal data itself, 
it will be considered processing in the context of the activities of that EU establishment, 
i. e., in the context of its own activities. So, as this scenario would be rather simple, 
there is no need to go further into details. 
As for the second case, when an EU establishment does not conduct processing itself, 
however, may be deemed being inextricably linked to the activities of the non-EU 
controller or processor in some other ways than processing, this example requires 
thorough analysis. 
In Update of Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law, the WP29 alleged that if there is an 
inextricable link ascertained, ―the EU law will apply to that processing by the non-EU 
entity, whether or not the EU establishment plays a role in the processing of data‖
116
 
(emphasis added). So, on the basis of the lexical construction, the WP29 conceded that 
the EU establishment may not play a role in the data processing. It is worth mentioning 
that the Opinion was adopted after the judgment in Google Spain case and, thus, reflects 
the outcome of the case.  
Resuming the judgment in Google Spain case, the EDPB noted that the EU law will 
apply to the inextricably linked activities of an EU establishment and its non-EU parent 
company ―even if that local establishment is not actually taking any role in the data 
processing itself‖
117
 (emphasis added). As it follows, the EDPB took the same view as 
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the WP29 had done before and interpreted the function of the Spanish establishment as 
‗not taking any role in processing‘. 
Unlike quoted above data protection authorities, Advocate General Jääskinen deemed 
that the establishment, nevertheless, ―plays a relevant role in the processing of personal 
data if it is linked to a service involved in selling targeted advertisement‖
118
 (emphasis 
added). As it follows, an establishment has to play a relevant role in processing, for all 
that. In confirmation of his words, Jääskinen made reference to the earlier adopted 
Opinion 1/2008 of the WP29. 
In the mentioned Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines, the 
WP29 explained that ‗in the context of the activities of an establishment‘ implies that 
the establishment has to ―play a relevant role in the particular processing operation‖119. 
It has also provided few felicitous examples which are put here with insignificant 
changes, however, without losing their sense. So, an establishment in the Union will be 
considered playing a relevant role in data processing, if it is, for instance, ―responsible 
for relations with users of the search engine‖ in a particular EU state. In this case, the 
establishment is representing the interests of its parent company, therefore, such a role 
can be deemed considerable. Another example is about the EU establishment which 
observes the law enforcement requests prescribed by the EU data protection authorities. 
Why this will be the case is obvious – complying with the prescriptions will directly 
affect the non-EU parent company since the establishment in the Union is its subsidiary. 
One more instance contemplates a search engine provider that establishes an office in 
the Union which ―is involved in the selling of targeted advertisements‖ to the residents 
of a particular Member State.120 The said instance is, obviously, drawn from one of the 
Google cases, so it will be returned to further for closer analysis. 
To sum up, taking into account the examples of when an establishment would ‗play a 
role‘ and on the basis of what circumstances of the case the WP29 and the EDPB 
concluded that it may not play a role, it seems that the data protection authorities merely 
lost consistency in formulations since the examples do not contradict one another. 
Apparently, by stating that playing a role is not required, they actually meant that the 
processing does not necessarily have to be done by an establishment itself, though it 
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may be carried out so. Therefore, it is considered that playing a relevant role by the EU 
establishment in data processing carried out by a non-EU entity is actually an essential 
requirement, and it should be understood in a different way than ‗to perform processing 
by the EU establishment itself‘. 
As already mentioned, it was established by Court in Google Spain case that the 
processing does not necessarily have to be done by the said establishment itself in order 
to be considered as carried out in the context of its activities
121
, – or rather it can be 
done by, however, there is no such requirement. Granmar supported this view and 
turned attention to the other crucial point: if there is an establishment „of‟ the non-EU 
entity in the Union, then it does not matter for the applicability of the GDPR, whether 
the said establishment processes the data itself or it does not fulfil any processing 
activities
122
. Returning to Google Spain case, the Spanish establishment merely sold 
advertising space on the search engine, and it did not conduct any processing activities, 
– the latter were carried out by parent company Google Inc.
123
 In Weltimmo case, the 
legal representative in Hungary executed various duties, however, publication of 
personal data on the website and invoicing were not among them
124
. Nevertheless, in 
both cases, the Court concluded that there occurred processing in the context of the 
activities of the establishment
125
. The reasons for that will be discussed further 
hereinafter. 
Granmar passed an opinion that ―it would be more convincing to apply the GDPR only 
when […] an establishment in the Union is actually involved in the data processing‖
126
. 
It is difficult to disagree with scholar. Indeed, if an EU establishment would take part in 
factual processing, its activity would be less problematic from the perspective of 
proving its involvement and establishing all that relationship between the non-EU entity 
and the establishment. However, that is not typically the case, – usually, the EU 
establishments of the non-EU parent companies play a minor role and do not process 
data themselves, therefore, if not the ‗in the context of‘ formula, it would be impossible 
to connect establishments in the Union with their parent companies and data processing 
standing behind them. 
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2.3.3. An inextricable link between the activities of an EU establishment and the 
data processing carried out by a non-EU controller or processor 
Providing more specific guidance concerning the meaning of ‗in the context of the 
activities of an EU establishment‘, the EDPB suggests following its recommendations. 
The first one envisages conducting analysis of the relationship between a non-EU 
controller or processor and its EU establishment, the second one – determining whether 
the latter is involved in revenue-raising in the Union
127
. What consolidates both criteria 
is that there has to be shown the existence of an inextricable link between the activities 
of an establishment in the Union and the data processing carried out by a non-EU entity. 
The listed criteria are discussed hereinafter. 
a) the relationship between a non-EU controller or processor and its EU 
establishment 
As stated above, even if a non-EU establishment does not process data itself, it still may 
be inextricably linked in some other way to the personal data processing activities of its 
non-EU parent entity. Admittedly, in general, the idea of the ‗link‘ is not a novelty to 
the EU data protection law since ‗in the context of the activities of an establishment‘ 
was presented in the DPD as well. However, the concept of the inextricable link is new 
to the EU data protection law – it was introduced in Google Spain case. Indubitably, the 
concept is going to be extensively used in the forthcoming cases, but so far as it was 
invoked first in Google Spain case, the latter will be contemplated closely as an 
example. 
In Google Spain case, Google‟s establishment located in Spain did not conduct any 
processing activities
128
. It acted as a commercial agent for its parent company Google 
Inc. which was established in the United States. The Spanish establishment was 
intended to promote and facilitate the sale of advertising space, which was offered by 
the parent company, on the territory of Spain.
129
 Taking into consideration the 
mentioned facts, the Court concluded that the activities of the Spanish establishment 
and the US parent company were inextricably linked. It argued that ―the activities 
relating to the advertising space constitute the means of rendering the search engine at 
issue economically profitable‖ and, in addition, the same engine served as the means of 
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carrying out the said activities
130
. Moreover, as the Court noted, the fact that the search 
results and the advertisements were displayed on the same page, was the absolute 
evidence of the link between the activities in question
131
. In fact, there occurred the 
interdependency which caused the inextricable link between the EU establishment and 
the non-EU parent company. As follows from the judgment, there has to be a 
connection between the economic activity of the EU establishment and the data 
processing carried out by the non-EU entity.  
As the WP29 later clarified, it was found that the advertising activities performed by 
Spanish establishment were ―linked to the business model of Google‖ since the 
advertising corresponded to the results which the search engine supplied
132
. If not the 
activities of Google Spain, which were relating to the advertising space, Google Inc. 
would gain less profits; conversely, if not the engine, the EU establishment would not 
be able to promote and sell the advertising space which, in turn, brings profit to Google 
Inc. and so forth. As Advocate General Jääskinen noted in his Opinion, the 
establishment appeared ―as the bridge for the referencing service to the advertising 
market‖ in Spain
133
. Therefore, as shown, the activities between the Spanish 
establishment and the US company were indeed inextricably linked. This allowed the 
conclusion that the processing of data was conducted in the context of the commercial 
and advertising activities of the EU establishment on the territory of Spain
134
. 
The most important takeaway in the analyzed case is that even if an EU establishment 
does not carry out any data processing operations itself, its other activities can still 
trigger the applicability of Article 3(1) GDPR to the data processing on the basis of 
being otherwise inextricably linked to the data processing operations of the non-EU 
parent company.  
A much alike example took place in a so-called Facebook Fan Page case in which the 
processing activities were carried out jointly by Facebook Inc. (a US-based parent 
company) and Facebook Ireland (based in the Republic of Ireland respectively). There 
was one more Facebook entity involved – Facebook Germany – an establishment that 
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was ―responsible for the promotion and sale of advertising space‖135 activities which 
rendered Facebook‟s services at issue profitable. As Advocate General Bot noted, ―the 
Facebook Group almost completely depends on the sale of advertising space‖136, 
therefore, the business success of Facebook depended much on the activities of German 
establishment. Taking the said facts into consideration, the CJEU held that the 
advertising activities of German establishment that brought income to Facebook and the 
data processing carried out jointly by Facebook Inc. and Facebook Ireland were 
inextricably linked137.  
As the WP29 noted, if it is established that ―there is an inextricable link between the 
activities of an EU establishment and the processing of data carried out by a non-EU 
controller, EU law will apply to that processing by the non-EU entity‖
138
 (emphasis 
added). Korff deems that the italicized wordings ‗the processing‘ and ‗that processing‘ 
have to be interpreted ―as referring to a specific processing operation‖
139
. This is an 
utterly relevant observation since it allows to draw an important conclusion – when it is 
established that the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of the EU 
establishment, Article 3(1) GDPR will apply only to that particular processing 
operation, or, possibly, to the series of processing operations, if the inextricable link 
occurs in relation to all of them. In confirmation of his words, Korff adds that if it was 
not the case, the Court would have held that the EU data protection law applies to the 
processing with respect to ―people using its [Google‟s] browser from outside the EU‖ as 
well, however, the Court ruled that the law applies only to the processing regarding 
users from Spain
140
. Indeed, the Court tried the case regarding particular processing 
operations, and therefore only those operations were taken into account when 
determining the existence of the establishment in Spain. 
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b) an EU establishment involved in revenue-raising in the Union 
Just the same as the inextricably linked activities discussed above, the ‗revenue-raising 
in the Union‘ is a new concept to the EU data protection law, and it originates from the 
judgment in Google Spain case. In essence, it envisages that an EU establishment raises 
revenue in the EU, and that is sufficiently inextricably linked to the individuals in the 
Union and to the data processing conducted outside the EU by a non-EU entity so that 
potentially it may confirm that the processing is being done in the context of the 
activities of the EU establishment
141
.  
Returning to Google Spain case, the activities regarding promotion and selling of 
advertisements by the Spanish establishment were admitted by the Court as ―the means 
of rendering the search engine at issue economically profitable‖
142
. As it follows, the 
fact of making profit in the Union was considered sufficient to connect it with the data 
processing activities of Google Inc. so that to constitute inextricably linked activities.  
As already mentioned hereinbefore, the search results and the advertisements were 
displayed on the same page
143
. On the basis of that fact, the WP29 emphasized that 
Google‟s activities were unseparable from the revenue raised from advertising
144
, – that 
is what guided the Court in rendering its decision. Indeed, the word ‗unseparable‘ is 
probably the most felicitous one to define what being ‗inextricably linked‘ means. 
As stated above, the revenue-raising by an EU establishment has to be inextricably 
linked to the individuals in the Union as well. Following the Opinion of Advocate 
General Jääskinen
145
, the Court noted that one of the requirements of concluding that 
there takes place data processing in the context of the activities of an EU establishment 
is that the latter ―orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that Member 
State
146
‖
147
. At some point, this has something in common with the targeting principle 
which is not applicable in the given case. However, actually, the ‗link to the individuals 
in the Union‘ has to be construed as the confirmation of the real and effective exercise 
of activities (discussed in paragraph 2.2.5 of the paper hereinbefore). This seems to be 
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reasonable since all the elements of the establishment test are interconnected and, in 
fact, one and the same element can be used for the consideration of various steps of the 
establishment test. 
There are certain activities of the EU establishments that will most likely fall under 
‗inextricable link‘ condition – in the first place, it is all kinds of activities that concern 
the EU sales offices, i. e., promotion or selling of advertising, marketing directing at the 
EU residents
148
, commercial prospection
149
 and so forth. Why namely those activities, is 
obvious, – they enable bringing profit to the parent companies established outside the 
Union. 
2.4. Geographical location pursuant to Article 3(1) GDPR 
Under Article 3(1) GDPR, as the EDPB rightly observed, the geographical location 
matters in respect of the place of establishment of a controller or a processor and their 
establishments, if any in the Union; by contrast, it is unimportant concerning the place 
of processing and the location of data subjects whose personal data is being 
processed
150
. It is necessary to discuss this closer in the context of the paper. 
2.4.1. The place of establishment of a controller or a processor 
In general, a controller or a processor, notably its primary establishment, can be 
established either in the Union, or in the third state. Since this paper deals only with the 
non-EU controllers and processors, the geographical location is, in this case, important 
in establishing that a non-EU entity has its main establishment outside the Union. 
2.4.2. The place of a controller’s or a processor’s establishment, if any in the Union 
Once it is concluded that a controller or a processor is established in the third state, 
then, for the purposes of Article 3(1) GDPR, it is necessary to check whether a non-EU 
entity has a business presence in the Union that can constitute an EU establishment. 
Thus, the geographical location matters also when determining the fact of a proper 
representation in the Union. 
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2.4.3. The place of processing 
It is directly stipulated in Article 3(1) GDPR that the Regulation applies ―regardless of 
whether the processing takes place in the Union or not‖
151
. That is to say, the GDPR 
will apply to the data processing irrespective of the actual place of processing, though, 
under the stipulation that all other conditions specified in Article 3(1) GDPR and 
contemplated hereinbefore are met. Therefore, even in case of the non-EU entities, it 
does not matter whether the processing occurs in the Union or in the third state. The 
really important thing is to prove that the processing takes place in the context of the 
activities of a non-EU establishment. So, as just shown, the place of processing does not 
affect the applicability of Article 3(1) GDPR. 
2.4.4. The location of data subjects 
The location of data subjects whose personal data is being processed is not important 
under the provision in question. Therefore, the data subjects can be either on the 
territory of a Member State or on the territory of any other third state. In the instance 
exemplified by the EDPB, the data subjects were located in three African states, and the 
processing of their data was carried out by the company established in France; since the 
location of data subjects does not matter, Article 3(1) GDPR would apply to such 
processing
152
. It is worth emphasizing that the location of data subjects is an 
unimportant feature in the cases where Article 3(1) GDPR applies. By contrast, the 
location of data subjects will be taken into account under conditions stipulated in Article 
3(2) GDPR which will be discussed further. 
2.5. Special cases of application of the establishment principle to the non-EU 
controllers and processors 
2.5.1. Differentiated approach in the application of the establishment principle to 
the non-EU controllers and processors 
The GDPR applies to both non-EU controllers and non-EU processors. However, the 
ascertained applicability of the Regulation, for instance, to the non-EU controller does 
not automatically invoke the applicability to the processor within the same processing 
operation, and vice versa. Therefore, the EDPB has laid stress on that and clarified in its 
Guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR. 
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According to the EDPB, the applicability of the Regulation has to be considered 
separately for a controller and a processor for each activity (as was already noted 
hereinbefore) and each processing operation
153
. Korff expounds this by making an 
example in which the same entity appears as the data controller in one processing 
operation, however, its role changes to joint controller or even data processor in another 
operation
154
. This is particularly true for ―complex arrangements between different 
entities including groups of companies‖
155
. Indeed, in the given example, all sorts of 
interconnections and capacities may occur between the entities. 
The EDPB asserts that the GDPR provides for ―different and dedicated provisions or 
obligations‖ applicable to controllers and processors
156
. However, it is not exactly so. 
With respect to processor‘s obligations, they are set out substantially in Article 28 
GDPR
157
. As regards obligations related to controllers, they are not singled out, so far as 
effectively all the GDPR provisions apply to them, except for those which are 
exclusively applicable to processors. 
2.5.2. Application of the establishment principle to the non-EU joint controllers 
As Korff has rightly observed, the EDPB had not addressed joint controllers in respect 
of the application of the establishment principle to them
158
. Albeit joint controllers are 
basically controllers, and thereby the respectful GDPR provisions will apply to them, 
however, the nature of interrelation between joint controllers deserves separate 
consideration. 
To redress this omission, it is necessary to turn first to the definition. It implies that joint 
controllers are ―two or more controllers [that] jointly determine the purposes and means 
of processing‖
159
. On closer inspection, pursuant to the WP29, joint control occurs 
when, firstly, there are at least two different controllers, secondly, they act jointly in 
respect of the specific processing operation and, thirdly, those controllers determine 
―either the purpose or those essential elements of the means which characterize a 
controller‖
160
 (emphasis added). As it follows, in joint control, a controller does not 
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have to participate in defining both the purposes and means of processing, rather, it is 
important that actions of joint controllers concern one and the same processing 
operation. This specification seems to be reasonable since it lays stress that the 
allocation of responsibilities between controllers may indeed be of all kinds, and one 
controller may be responsible only for a minor part of a data processing operation. 
The WP29 further clarifies that the level of participation of the controllers ―may take 
different forms and does not need to be equally shared‖, that is to say, joint controllers 
may share determining all purposes and means together or decide who is doing which 
part of it
161
. For this purpose, the GDPR prescribes that in order to comply with the 
obligations placed upon them, joint controllers have to ―in a transparent manner 
determine their respective responsibilities‖ in the form of an arrangement between 
them
162
, which is likely to be done in a written way
163
. Such requirement aims at 
determining allocation of obligations and, thus, responsibilities of each controller when 
it comes to the specific processing operation. 
In practice, different controllers may be responsible for the data processing ―at different 
stages and to different degrees‖
164
. For instance, in Fashion ID case, the CJEU admitted 
that Fashion ID acted together with Facebook Ireland as joint controllers in regard to 
determining the purposes and means of ―the collection and disclosure‖ of the personal 
data, however, with respect to all ―subsequent operations involving the processing […] 
by Facebook Ireland after their transmission to the latter‖, Fashion ID was not 
acknowledged to be a controller
165
. That is to say, in everything what concerns the 
subsequent operations, only Facebook Ireland appeared as a data controller. Therefore, 
as just shown, the level of participation of controllers in each processing operation has 
to be evaluated in the light of specific facts of the case. 
As Advocate General Bot rightly noted, ‗joint‘ responsibility is not the same as ‗equal‘ 
responsibility
166
. In this sense, ‗jointly‘ stands for ‗together with‘, and nothing more. 
This observation was met with support in a number of the CJEU‘s judgments which 
reiterated that ―the existence of joint responsibility does not necessarily imply equal 
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responsibility of the various operators involved in the processing of personal data‖
167
. 
To put it differently, if there are, for instance, two joint controllers at stake, and it is 
ascertained that controller ‗A‘ is considered to be pursued under the GDPR with respect 
to three specific processing operations, this does not mean that the fact of joint control 
would lead to controller ‗B‘ being responsible for the same three operations. By 
contrast, controller ‗B‘ may be responsible, for example, only for two out of three 
operations if it acted as a controller regarding those two ones. Since controller ‗A‘ 
appeared as a controller in all three cases, it will be subject to the GDPR controller 
obligations on the basis of three episodes. As regards controller ‗B‘, it acted jointly with 
controller ‗A‘ in two cases, therefore, the GDPR controller obligations apply to it on the 
grounds of those two processing operations. To conclude, the GDPR controller 
obligations apply to joint controllers separately and in view of contribution of each of 
them to the specific processing operation or its part. 
2.5.3. A controller subject to the GDPR uses a non-EU processor (the indirect 
application through Article 28 GDPR) 
Quite often, a controller and a processor involved in the same processing operation or a 
set of processing operations are on the opposite sides of the EU, that is to say, one of 
them is based in the Union and another one outside the Union. Obviously, in such cases, 
the applicability of the GDPR to them will vary on the basis of the establishment 
principle. 
Supposedly, a controller with an EU establishment decided to use a processor who is 
not established in the Union. In this case, the controller will be subject to the GDPR due 
to being established in the EU and processing in the context of its EU establishment‘s 
activities. However, as regards the non-EU processor, the situation is not that 
straightforward as it may seem on the surface. That is to say, the non-EU processor, 
even though not being established in the Union, will not avoid the application of the 
Regulation to it. 
In this respect, the EDPB stipulates that the controller will have ―to ensure by contract 
or other legal act that the processor processes the data in accordance with the GDPR‖, 
namely complies with the GDPR processor obligations set out in Article 28(3) 
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GDPR
168
. This is not a requirement made-up by the EDPB since, indeed, the Regulation 
provides for a provision which states that ―[p]rocessing by a processor shall be 
governed by a contract or other legal act under Union or Member State law‖
169
. So, 
basically, the EDPB has interpreted how the said provision has to be put into practice. 
Since the provision in question does not specify whether it concerns the processors in 
the Union or outside the Union, it results from this that the requirement concerns all 
processors, irrespectively of the place of establishment. 
Why namely the controller has to ensure that the non-EU processor is obliged by 
contract or other legal act to abide by the GDPR provisions, lies in the controller‘s own 
obligation to use only ‗reliable‘ processors. This means that the processor has to be able 
―to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures‖ that would ensure the 
processing in conformity with the GDPR
170
. As a result, the non-EU processor will 
―become indirectly subject‖
171
 through Article 28 GDPR to some processor obligations 
on account of the contract or other legal act (emphasis added). In this sense, the non-EU 
processor‘s legal status becomes effectively the same as if it was the EU-based 
processor. If considering whether this is right or wrong approach, many would incline to 
choose ‗right‘ since, first of all, not imposing the obligations on the non-EU processor 
would put the EU individuals‘ rights at risk; secondly, if conclusion of the contract or 
other legal act bothers the non-EU party, its analogue can always be found on the EU 
market of processors instead. 
It is worth noting that in the case at issue the data processing has to be carried out by the 
non-EU processor‘s establishment based outside the EU. If, for instance, the non-EU 
processor has establishments both in the Union and outside the Union, and if the 
processor is going to use one of its EU establishments for the processing activities 
ordered by the EU controller, ―then GDPR processor obligations would apply directly to 
the processor‖
172
. As regards such multinational data processors, Korff suggests that the 
processor‘s obligations required under the Regulation should be stipulated in a 
―standard overall contract – typically referred to as a Master Services Agreement […], 
or in a separate addendum to that contract‖
173
. It seems that such an agreement would be 
a more practical solution than every time concluding a contract with the EU controllers. 
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Moreover, it would demonstrate the non-EU company‘s desire to comply with the 
GDPR. 
2.5.4. A controller not subject to the GDPR uses an EU processor (providing a 
processing service) 
There will be quite another situation if a non-EU controller that is not subject to the 
GDPR decides to choose an EU-based processor to carry out processing on its behalf. 
With respect to the non-EU controller, it will not be pursued under the GDPR on the 
stipulation that it neither conducts processing in the context of the activities of its EU 
establishment (if there is any) – thereby Article 3(1) GDPR is dismissed, – nor targets 
individuals in the Union in either form – Article 3(2) GDPR falls away as well
174
.       
Of course, if other circumstances at place, i. e., the opposite to the mentioned above 
ones, the GDPR controller obligations may apply. However, commonly, in the 
straightforward scenario, there are no grounds for the application of the controller 
obligations to the non-EU controller.  
As regards the EU processor in the case at stake, it will be subject to the GDPR 
processor obligations on the basis of being established in the Union and carrying out 
processing in the context of the activities of that EU establishment
175
. In other words, 
the Regulation will apply so far as all the conditions stipulated in Article 3(1) GDPR 
regarding the EU processor are met. 
As shown above, the applicability of the establishment principle to the EU processor 
does not actuate the applicability to the non-EU controller, which is notably the 
opposite effect to the situation discussed in paragraph 2.5.3 of the paper hereinbefore. 
The fact of the matter is that the non-EU processor, though being itself subject to the 
GDPR, has neither the obligation nor the right to impose the GDPR obligations on the 
non-EU controller. As the EDPB noted, ―[b]y instructing a processor in the Union, the 
controller not subject to GDPR is not carrying out processing ―in the context of the 
activities of the processor in the Union‖‖
176
, otherwise, the effect would vary. That is to 
say, each of the parties remains to conduct processing in the context of its own 
activities.  
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Moreover, ―the processor is merely providing a processing service which is not 
―inextricably linked‖ to the activities of the controller‖
177
 (emphasis added). The 
relationship which occurs between two entities is defined by the EDPB as the 
relationship of the client company and the processor
178
. To put it even more simply, one 
company, – the client, – hires another company, – the contractor, – to carry out the 
processing service on its behalf. In view of this, it seems that the legal relationship at 
issue lies more in the field of contract law than the data protection law, thereby there is 
no wonder that the GDPR cannot be applied to the client company established in the 
third state. 
The EU processor being pursued under the GDPR will most likely have to deal with the 
personal data collected ―in a non-GDPR-compliant manner‖
179
 since the data was first 
processed by the non-EU controller which probably did not follow the GDPR 
provisions. Therefore, in order to not to run risks of breaking the law, the EU processor 
should ensure, for instance, by contractual means that the other party provides data for 
processing within the law
180
. Such a contract would regulate the relationship ‗client – 
processor‘. The need to settle a contract comes from the EU processor‘s obligation for 
its own part to process ―under Union or Member State law‖
181
, despite the fact that the 
non-EU controller is not subject to the GDPR. 
An EU-based processor as an establishment of a non-EU controller 
The EDPB has passed an interesting opinion, though without further explanation, that 
―a processor in the EU should not be considered to be an establishment of a data 
controller within the meaning of Article 3(1) merely by virtue of its status as processor 
on behalf of a controller‖
182
 (emphasis added). On a strict reading, this means that there 
may be the cases where the fact of using the EU processor will be equated with having 
an establishment in the Union. However, what other conditions are implicated the 
EDPB has not specified. 
Korff deems that in this case the EU processor has to do something more than merely 
data processing on behalf of the non-EU controller: the EU processor‘s activities must 
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be ――inextricably linked‖ – read: essential to – the non-EU controller organisation‖, for 
instance, to revenue-raising
183
. So, the logic is the same as when showing that the 
processing is being conducted in the context of the activities of an establishment in the 
Union. Consequently, if the EU processor is acknowledged to be the non-EU 
controller‘s establishment in the Union, this means that the non-EU controller is 
established in the EU and, moreover, processes data in the context of the activities of 
the said establishment. As a result, the GDPR will apply to the non-EU controller. 
Indeed, the given example may be the case, moreover, it may be the only possible case 
since the concept of establishment in the Union does not envisage the existence of other 
applicable grounds. Furthermore, from the practical perspective, the given scenario 
looks rather feasible: the processor may indeed carry out processing activities to the 
extent that it contributes to the revenue-raising by the controller. This example confirms 
the observations made in paragraph 2.2.4 of the paper hereinbefore, when stating that an 
EU company which was hired specifically for the purposes of the non-EU entity, may 
be considered as an establishment in the Union. Thereby, as shown above, the non-EU 
controller may be applicable to the GDPR controller obligations due to having the 
establishment, though through the EU processor, in the Union, and the given case may 
occur only if the EU processor‘s activities are considered inextricably linked to the 
processing carried out by the non-EU controller. Under other circumstances, the GDPR 
will not apply to the non-EU controller. 
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III. APPLICABILITY OF THE TARGETING PRINCIPLE (ARTICLE 3(2) 
GDPR) 
3.1. The targeting principle  
Even if a non-EU entity is not established in the Union, the GDPR can still apply to it. 
In contrast to the establishment principle that is applicable to both the EU companies 
and the non-EU ones, the targeting principle is oriented purely towards the controllers 
and processors that are not established in the Union. To put more specifically, it also 
focuses on those non-EU entities which do not process personal data in the context of 
the activities of their EU establishments (if such are available)
184
. In any event, the 
applicability of the targeting principle may be possible on precondition that the 
establishment principle is not applicable. Therefore, it seems reasonable to start 
checking the targeting test (contemplated below) after it is found impossible to apply 
the establishment principle. 
The targeting criterion is underlaid by the principle of lex loci solutionis, pursuant to 
which the choice of law is defined by the place where the ―contractual performance is 
being offered‖
185
. To put it into the context of the matter at stake, the territory of the EU 
will be the place where the data subjects are targeted, therefore, the law of the Union 
will be decisive, and the Regulation will apply. Notably, in order to fully convey the 
meaning of the given criterion, it is suggested to use term ‗the marketplace rule‘
186
 as 
opposed to the principle of lex loci solutionis. Even though both terms are practically 
synonyms, ‗the marketplace‘ often refers to ‗virtual marketplace‘, thus, includes broader 
range of targeting activities, in particular online-related matters of targeting the EU data 
subjects
187
. Due to the said feature, ‗the marketplace rule‘ better reflects the information 
society legal reality.  
The targeting principle is stipulated in Article 3(2) GDPR and reads as follows:      
“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in 
the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the 
processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of 
whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or 
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(b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the 
Union.”
188
 
As it follows, the Regulation envisages two alternative categories of activities, – 
offering of goods or services and monitoring, – which, if performed by a non-EU 
controller or processor, will invoke the application of Article 3(2) GDPR. It is utterly 
important for the applicability of the targeting principle that the mentioned activities 
concern individuals exactly in the EU. 
3.2. The concept of targeting 
In order to define the scope of targeting, it is necessary to inquire into a question of 
where ‗targeting‘ originates from and the evolution of the understanding of the given 
concept. This will allow determining not only what the processing activities are related 
to, but also what those activities are aimed at. 
The predecessor of the GDPR – the DPD dating from 1995 – did not contain any 
reference to targeting or related notions so far as the grounds for the applicability of the 
DPD to the non-EU entities were based on the use of equipment criterion
189
. So, the 
concept of targeting in the GDPR has other origin. 
The first mentioning of the ‗directing activities to the Member States‘ took place in the 
context of consumer contracts in Brussels I Regulation
190
. Later, in Rome I, there was 
confirmed the consistency with Brussels I Regulation regarding the ‗directed at‘ test 
with respect to consumer contracts; also, there was used for the first time, notably, in 
the same context, the notion of ‗targeting activities at the Member State‘
191
. Thus, the 
regulation Rome I identified ‗directing‘ and ‗targeting‘ of activities as the same 
concepts. The Brussels I Regulation‘s successor, which has repealed it in 2012, 
reiterated the existing ‗directed at‘ test without elaborating on the issue at stake
192
, 
thereby remaining the meaning of the concept unamended. Furthermore, Advocate 
General Trstenjak in her Opinion in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof joined cases used an 
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example illustrating that the ―use of websites to target advertising to nationals of other 
Member States‖ is a criterion sustaining directing of activities
193
. As it follows, if 
‗directing‘ can be shown by means of ‗targeting‘, the given concepts are mutually 
complementary. To conclude at this point, the concept of targeting originates from the 
consumer protection field where ‗directing at‘ and ‗targeting to‘ have close meanings or 
are even used as synonyms. 
The WP29 has suggested in its Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law to take targeting 
criterion used in consumer protection field as a basis for future legislation in relation to 
the non-EU controllers. In the WP29‘s view, this ―would bring additional legal certainty 
to [the non-EU] controllers as they would have to apply the same criterion for activities 
which often trigger the application of both consumer and data protection rules‖
194
. 
Indubitably, if the Opinion was adopted some years later, it would have concerned the 
non-EU processors as well. At this point, there are two important takeaways: first, the 
WP29 has initiated launching of the targeting criterion into data protection law, second, 
it has acknowledged that unification of consumer and data protection rules is necessary 
with regard to the controllers (and probably processors) not established in the Union. 
Furthermore, the way the WP29 has exemplified targeting allows concluding that 
‗directing activities to‘ is a form of targeting: ―targeting could consist of: […] services 
explicitly accessible or directed to EU residents‖
195
 (emphasis added). So, unlike 
consumer protection, data protection field regards ‗targeting‘ and ‗directing‘ activities 
as the whole and its part. In other words, ‗directing‘ means to target, however, 
‗targeting‘ may have many other forms. 
The WP29‘s recommendations named above concerning the non-EU entities were taken 
into consideration and were finally embodied in Article 3(2) GDPR. Notably, the 
Regulation itself mentions ‗targeting‘ only once throughout the whole document with 
respect to the data subjects in the Union
196
, however, does not do so with regard to the 
criteria provided in Article 3(2) GDPR. In this respect, the Regulation does not provide 
clear understanding as to whether it supports the WP29‘s views concerning the concept 
of targeting or whether it has different vision. 
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Aiming at assisting Asia Pacific Privacy Authorities (APPA) to understand the 
requirements of the GDPR, the WP29 has issued a document in which it explained that 
the Regulation, in particular, applies to the non-EU controllers and processors ―that 
target individuals in the EU by offering goods and services […] or that monitor the 
behavior of individuals in the EU‖
197
 (emphases added). As Svantesson noted, the most 
important thing about this explanation is the ―specific inclusion of the phrase ‗target 
individuals in the EU‘‖
198
. Indeed, what the WP29 has done is that it has clearly and 
directly named the main feature of activities covered by Article 3(2) GDPR – targeting, 
– which, as noted above, was not done by the Regulation. Notably, on a strict reading, it 
looks like the WP29 has referred ‗offering goods and services‘ to the forms of targeting, 
however, has separated ‗monitoring‘ as if has not considered the latter as a form of 
targeting. It seems that such formulation was not really implied by the WP29 since it 
does not meet support in the rest of the document. 
Finally, the EDPB in the Guidelines on the territorial scope of the GDPR 
unambiguously refers to the targeting criterion as the common denominator for the 
activities set out in Article 3(2) GDPR. That is to say, the EDPB uses ‗targeting‘ as a 
general term which designates both ‗offering goods and services‘ and ‗monitoring the 
behaviour‘
199
. The said activities may appear in various forms, as will be shown 
hereinafter in the paper. Nevertheless, irrespectively of the form, the activities must 
have features attributable to ‗targeting‘ in order to invoke application of the targeting 
principle. 
Indubitably, ‗targeting‘ was chosen by the EDPB to name the respective principle so not 
without purpose – it to the best advantage characterizes the scope of the activities 
concerned. Indeed, what consolidates ‗offering of goods and services to‘ together with 
‗monitoring the behaviour of‘ is the data subjects in the Union to whom the said 
activities are directed. Notably, the EDPB Guidelines is the first document of the data 
protection authority after the WP29‘s Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law which 
contemplates the concept of directing activities. The EDPB deems that even though the 
concept of directing activities is not the same as offering of goods or services, it still 
may be used to assess ―whether goods or services are offered to a data subject in the 
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Union‖
200
. That is to say, ‗directing‘ appears as a form of conducting ‗offering‘ and 
therefore may indicate the targeting character of activities. In spite of the fact that the 
concept of directing activities originates from consumer protection field where it has 
close meaning with ‗targeting‘, in data protection law the case is different.  
Furthermore, by directing activities, the non-EU controllers or processors set 
themselves a task to reach certain goals, i. e., to target the EU individuals. To put it 
differently, the concept of targeting characterizes not only the scope of the nature of the 
activities, i. e., targeting as an activity, but also defines the subjective component of the 
non-EU entities which is to reach the data subjects in the Union – targeting as a goal. 
Given subjective component will be discussed further in more detail. 
3.3. The targeting test 
In order to determine whether a non-EU controller or processor directs its activities at 
the data subjects in the Union, it is necessary to apply the targeting criteria. The test 
offered by the EDPB does not introduce any additional conditions to those stipulated in 
Article 3(2) GDPR. However, as mentioned above, it seems necessary to improve the 
algorithm provided by the EDPB. Thus, it is suggested to check the applicability of the 
targeting principle following such steps:  
1) checking the applicability of the establishment principle201 – if impossible to 
apply, then proceeding to the next steps set out in this test;  
2) determining whether the processing of personal data concerns the data subjects 
who are in the Union;  
3) determining whether the processing is related to either the offering of goods or 
services or to the monitoring of data subjects‘ behaviour within the Union
202
. 
As appears from the above, the processing is a central determinant in the targeting test. 
It creates a two-way connection between the targeting activities, – offering of goods or 
services and monitoring, – and the data subjects in the Union. If at least one out of three 
specified elements is missing, the targeting test will not be passed.  
Practical application of the targeting test can be illustrated with a real case based on the 
GDPR. On 11 October 2018, the UK Information Commissioner‘s Office (ICO) issued 
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a written warning against the US-based newspaper The Washington Post regarding its 
cookie consent practices
203
. According to the complaint raised with the ICO, in order to 
get access to the website of the newspaper, a user in the EU had to ―either accept 
cookies or to pay for a full subscription to the service‖
204
; in the latter case, cookies and 
tracking would be, of course, switched off. The ICO took the view that under mentioned 
circumstances the ―consent cannot be freely given and is invalid‖ since there was no 
alternative presented to users which would at the same time exclude fees and cookies
205
. 
In the given case, Article 3(2)(a) GDPR was applicable to The Washington Post so far 
as the US company did not have any business presence in the Union, however, 
intentionally offered its subscription services to the EU individuals. 
Presumably, there are no grounds found for the application of the establishment criteria. 
So, this chapter will contemplate the targeting test omitting the first step. 
3.4. Data subjects in the Union 
Notably, ‗data subjects who are in the Union‘ is the cornerstone of the whole Article 
3(2) GDPR. It is an equally important condition under both alternative types of 
processing activities envisaged by the targeting principle – offering of goods or services 
as well as monitoring of behaviour. Thus, whether Article 3(2) GDPR is applicable to 
the specific processing activity directly depends on whether targeted data subjects are 
located in the Union. 
3.4.1. Unlimited scope of a data subject 
First of all, it is necessary to define what categories of data subjects are protected under 
the Regulation and, consequently, the targeting of whom will trigger the application of 
the targeting principle. 
Broadly speaking, the Regulation grants protection to all individuals who are in the 
Union in relation to the processing of their personal data. It applies irrespectively of the 
nationality, place of residence
206
, citizenship or any other data subject‘s legal status
207
. 
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Thereby the targeting principle may concern the hereupon listed categories of data 
subjects: EU citizens, non-EU citizens, stateless persons, refugees, asylum seekers – 
everyone who resides in the Union. In addition, it encompasses all other individuals 
who do not reside, but happen to be temporarily in the territory of the EU, such as cross-
border commuters, visitors, tourists or even travellers in transit. For instance, a resident 
of Lugano (Switzerland) who travels on weekdays to visit his parents in Como (Italy), 
will enjoy protection under the Regulation whenever his personal data is being 
processed while he is in the territory of Italy. As it follows, the scope of a data subject is 
not limited to any legal status defining a physical person. Therefore, in the context of 
Article 3(2) GDPR, the only significant circumstance is that the data subject in question 
is located within the Union. 
3.4.2. Spatial scope of stay in the Union 
In general, to be located in the Union in terms of spatial scope means that a data subject 
is ―physically present‖
208
 within the EU. Notably, the duration of the physical presence 
is not decisive – it can, roughly speaking, last one hour while a traveller is changing the 
plane at the airport of Munich, but the most important thing is that the processing of the 
traveller‘s personal data takes place at some point of time during those sixty minutes of 
staying in the EU. 
It should be reminded here what is implied when referring to the wording ‗in the 
Union‘. As previously noted in paragraph 1.6 of the paper hereinbefore, the GDPR is 
binding not only in all 27 Member States of the Union, but also on the territory of three 
more EEA states, namely Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Hence, the same 
understanding should be applied when contemplating Article 3(2) GDPR. That is to say, 
the wordings ‗data subjects (who are) in the Union‘ as well as ‗behaviour within the 
Union‘ should be understood broadly and therefore mean referring to the EU Member 
States along with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.  
Online being in the Union 
As regards the scope of stay in the Union in online environment, Gömann deems that it 
is not clear when an online behaviour of a data subject is considered to occur within the 
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Union and when not
209
. Indeed, ‗being in the Union online‘ is a problematic notion 
since it requires setting out how legal EU borders correlate with the online ubiquity. 
Obviously, the latter is a much broader notion: if an online behaviour can take place in 
the Union, then it appears from this that some other online behaviour can occur in the 
third state. Therefore, in order to show that the online behaviour takes place namely in 
the EU and not somewhere else, there has to be a certain connection with the Union.  
In this respect, Gömann flatly discards ―the place of Internet access or the location of 
the servers processing the information‖ as the possible solutions
210
, however, does not 
provide any probable suggestions instead. With respect to the location of the servers, it 
indeed does not matter at all since, according to the GDPR, the place of processing is 
irrelevant for the applicability of the Regulation
211
.  
However, as concerns the place of Internet access, it is difficult to agree with Gömann. 
It seems that namely this link would be capable of connecting the data subjects and the 
Union. Every time when an individual accesses the Internet, his or her location is 
identified by servers, and even though that location is read as just an IP address, it 
allows determining practically an exact physical location of that data subject. Thus, 
even in the cases of online behaviour, the data subjects must be physically present in the 
Union, notably when accessing the Internet. 
Granmar suggests that it should not matter where the Internet is accessed from, – 
whether from any of the EU Member States (which is true since in such case a data 
subject is in the Union), or whether ―from the place in a third country‖ alleging that 
otherwise there would be ―inconsistency in the Union legal order if the GDPR could not 
be invoked only because the website was accessed from a place in a third country‖
212
. 
Actually, the last part sits uncomfortably with the concept of being located in the Union. 
Bearing in mind that the scholar implies in the first place the EU citizens in the given 
example, some kernel of good sense can be found here, i. e., how come that the EU 
citizens are not granted protection under the GDPR if they access the Internet from 
outside the Union, while the Regulation has such a far-reaching effect worldwide. 
Nevertheless, it is so. Accessing the Internet from the Union requires being physically 
present in the EU.  
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3.4.3. Temporal scope of stay in the Union 
The temporal component is no less important than the spatial one discussed above. 
However, its application is not that obvious. As Granmar noted, clear understanding of 
when exactly the data subjects have to be present within the EU allows determining the 
burden of proving resting on the non-EU controller or processor
213
. 
The EDPB suggests that the data subjects‘ being in the Union has to be evaluated ―at 
the moment when the relevant trigger activity takes place, i. e. at the moment of offering 
of goods or services or the moment when the behaviour is being monitored‖, and adds 
that the duration of the said targeting activities does not matter
214
. On the surface, it may 
seem that the guidance rephrases the text of Article 3(2) GDPR and states the obvious. 
However, construing it this way, the EDPB actually raises more questions than provides 
the answers. 
First of all, it is unclear, what exactly is implicated by ―the relevant trigger activity‖ 
which defines when the data subjects have to be in the Union. Under the assumption 
that it is ‗the targeting activity‘ meant, then there should have been ‗offering‘ and 
„monitoring‟ activities specified in the explanatory part of the guidance coming after   
‗i. e.‘ This way, it would have been shown that the said activities target the data 
subjects in the Union, but have not led to the processing yet. As it follows, the wording 
‗the behaviour is being monitored‘ implies that the processing is already being carried 
out, which is in advance as compared to ‗offering of goods or services‘ that does not 
necessarily envisage the processing (this issue is contemplated further in the paper). 
Thus, it is unlikely that the EDPB implied ‗targeting activities‘. 
Alternatively, if there were ‗the processing activities‘ implicated, then this would have 
been more logical since the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data, – not to 
the targeting activities as such. Anyway, even in such case, the provided guidance was 
not formulated correctly. There should have been ‗at the moment of processing related 
to the offering of goods or services‘ stipulated as the suitable point in time. In regard to 
the monitoring activities, the way how it was construed by the EDPB, – ‗the moment 
when the behaviour is being monitored‘, – expresses to the best advantage that the 
processing is being conducted. On the basis of the discussed above, it appears that the 
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data subjects‘ ‗being in the Union‘ has to be evaluated at the moment when the 
processing related to the relevant targeting activity takes place. 
„Stay in the Union‟ and monitoring  
Monitoring as such consists of the targeting and the immediate data processing which 
happens at the same time as the targeting activity. Thereby the moment of targeting and 
the moment of data processing concur, i. e., happen simultaneously. For this reason, the 
exact time when a specific processing operation occurred is easy to determine.  
In essence, targeting becomes monitoring only when it is accompanied by data 
processing. Conversely, if personal data of a data subject in the Union was not 
processed, this means that the data subject was not monitored. Thus, the subsequent 
processing after targeting is an essential condition. 
Based on the above, for the applicability of Article 3(2) GDPR on the basis of 
monitoring, there need to be two conditions met: first, a non-EU controller or processor 
monitors the behaviour of a data subject in the Union, i. e., targets a data subject and 
processes the data subject‘s personal data, second, the data subject is physically present 
in the Union. So, in case of monitoring, the moment when the behaviour is being 
monitored indeed determines the time of stay of the data subject in the Union. 
„Stay in the Union‟ and offering 
Another situation will be when considering offering of goods and services. The fact of 
the matter is that the moment of offering of goods or services is not a data processing 
yet. There is no doubt that offering is a form of targeting and, thus, envisages the latter. 
However, offering as such does not necessarily include processing, and that changes a 
lot.  
It is worth reminding that the GDPR is oriented largely towards online activities, 
however, it applies also to the offline ones. Therefore, offering of goods or services may 
occur also outside the scope of information society world. In real life, an offer of goods 
or services may be made in the form of various outdoor advertising, including even the 
publicity-mast advertising. For instance, a private language school located in China 
offers online language courses for the residents of Poland, and the school orders the 
placement of respective advertisements on the billboards in the biggest cities of Poland. 
Indubitably, individuals residing in Poland will be targeted by Chinese school, however, 
54 
 
unless they provide their personal data to the said school for the purposes of, say, 
enrolment to the courses, their data will not be processed. Thus, targeting occurs, 
however, this does not trigger the processing of data. 
As regards offering of goods or services online, in fact any offering will additionally 
invoke processing of personal data. The mere publication of an advertisement will target 
certain groups of individuals, depending on other circumstances of the case. It is not 
even required that a data subject has to accept an online offer aimed at him or her in 
order to cause the initiation of the processing of his or her data – the mere visit of the 
website will lead to the processing of at least the IP address of the visitor for the 
statistical purposes. Therefore, on the Internet, processing is unavoidable. 
As shown hereinbefore, offering as a targeting activity in general is possible even when 
the subsequent data processing does not take place. Such offer which does not draw 
after it the data processing will not invoke the application of Article 3(2) GDPR since 
the Regulation requires that the conditions of territorial scope are accompanied with the 
conditions of material scope present, i. e., the data processing must take place
215
. 
Therefore, the EDPB‘s suggestion stating that the data subject‘s ‗being in the Union‘ 
has to be evaluated at the moment of offering of goods or services is quite perfunctory 
and cannot be applied literally. Moreover, ‗aiming at‘ is not enough since the 
subsequent processing is required. It would be more precise to state that as regards 
offering, the data subject‘s stay in the Union has to be evaluated at the moment when 
the processing activity related to an offer of goods or services takes place. 
Thereby for the applicability of Article 3(2) GDPR on the basis of offering, the 
following conditions must be fulfilled: first, a non-EU controller or processor offers 
goods or services to a data subject in the EU, second, the data subject is physically 
present in the Union, third, the data processing takes place when the data subject is in 
the EU. This way, it is stressed that offering and processing are, though related, but 
separate activities, and to invoke the targeting principle, it is important that the data 
subject is located in the Union not when the offer is made, but when the processing 
related to the offer is carried out.  
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3.4.4. Temporal applicability of the targeting principle 
The data subjects‘ time of stay in the Union is a determinant which assists with defining 
the exact time when the targeting principle is applicable. To put it differently, it 
specifies at what point in time a non-EU controller or processor becomes pursued under 
Article 3(2) GDPR. 
As stated above, targeting itself does not always envisage data processing, namely 
monitoring includes processing of personal data at all times, however, offering may 
either come before the subsequent processing or not lead to the latter. Therefore, it is 
utterly important to define when the data processing is considered to be commenced. 
In terms of the definition of ‗processing‘, it can be ―any operation or set of operations 
which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data‖
216
. As a result, a non-
EU controller or processor is subject to the GDPR every time when it carries out 
processing operations related to data subjects in the Union. However, it would be too 
imprecise to allege that the time of the data processing defines when the targeting 
principle is applicable. The reason for that is that such conclusion would mean that all 
the conditions, including the data subjects‘ stay in the Union, would need to be met 
during various stages and forms of processing in order to apply the targeting principle. 
In practice, this would lead to such an absurd situation when a resident of the EU 
becomes deprived of his or her right to protection under the GDPR for the period of 
being outside the Union
217
 and obtains it back when returning home; respectively, as 
concerns the non-EU controller or processor, it would be out of responsibility for the 
data processing while the data subject is outside the Union. Thus, ‗time of the data 
processing‘ as a concept implying all respective forms of processing is too broad to use 
it for determining the commencement of processing. 
Returning to the operations which can be carried out on personal data, ‗collection‘ is a 
fundamental one since it serves as a basis for all the subsequent operations. Indeed, 
before being used, altered, analysed etc., data has to be collected first. Thus, without the 
stage of ‗collection‘ the other processing operations would be impossible. In terms of 
                                                          
216
 Article 4(2) GDPR 
217
 Plath, Kai-Uwe (Hrsg.), BDSG/DSGVO. Kommentar zum BDSG und zur DSGVO sowie den 
Datenschutzbestimmungen des TMG und TKG (2. Auflage). Köln: Otto Schmidt, 2016, Art. 3, rec. 14 in: 
Voigt – von dem Bussche 2017, p. 28  
56 
 
this observation, ―the time of the collection (in a broad sense) of the data is decisive‖
218
. 
Since that very moment of data collection the non-EU controller or processor becomes 
pursued under Article 3(2) GDPR. With respect to other processing operations which go 
after the collection, they must be fulfilled in accordance with the Regulation
219
, 
irrespectively of whether the data subject concerned is still located in the territory of the 
EU or has left it and will never come back.  
In this context, it is obvious that the wording of Article 3(2) GDPR about the data 
subjects in the Union should not be interpreted restrictively – instead, it should be 
implicated that the data subjects have to be located within the EU only at the moment of 
collection of their personal data. That would be enough for the application of the 
targeting principle. 
3.5. Offering of goods or services to data subjects in the Union  
3.5.1. The notion of goods and services 
While the GDPR stipulates that it applies to the processing activities that are related to 
the offering of goods and services
220
, it does not explain, – either for the purposes of 
Article 3(2)(a) GDPR, or for the Regulation in general, – which exactly goods and 
services are implied. Such explanation would be of assistance especially in the context 
of data processing activities in online environment which the GDPR is particularly 
intended for. 
In Safari‘s view, the mentioned terms should be sought for in the TFEU
221
. Though 
indirectly, the latter provides for the definition of ‗goods‘ as ―products originating in 
Member States [or] products coming from third countries which are in free circulation 
in Member States‖
222
. So, for the purposes of Article 3(2)(a) GDPR ‗goods‘ should be 
understood as any kind of products originating typically from the non-EU states, or, less 
sparsely, though still possibly, from the Member States, and that are offered by the non-
EU entities to data subjects in the Union. For example, an online shop based in the 
Republic of Korea sells cosmetics of Korean brands and offers delivery to the EU. 
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With regard to ‗services‘, the TFEU defines them as activities either of an industrial or 
commercial character, or activities of craftsmen or professions, that ―are normally 
provided for remuneration‖
223
. Since the Regulation does not set out any limitations as 
to the scope of services concerned, it seems that all mentioned forms of services through 
activities may take place on behalf of the non-EU controllers and processors.  
For instance, LinkedIn
224
 embraces at least two groups of services – activities of the 
commercial character, such as marketing and sales, and, additionally, activities related 
to the professions
225
. As for today, it offers advertising services ‗Sponsored content‘, 
‗Sponsored inmail‘, ‗Text ads‘ and ‗Dynamic ads‘ that aim at promotion businesses 
with the help of LinkedIn
226
. Another product, which is called ‗LinkedIn Sales 
Navigator‘, serves to ―target the right buyers‖
227
 and, as a result, score big business 
successes faster. While activities of the commercial character are very common on the 
Internet, activities of the professions are less known. Safari deems that this form of 
services manifests itself through LinkedIn creating proper environment where 
employers and potential employees can find one another and take advantage of such 
interaction
228
. Thus, as just shown, the services offered by the non-EU entities may take 
the shape of various activities as soon as the receiver of the offer benefits from it 
somehow or other. 
Notably, with respect to remuneration which the TFEU considers as typically following 
the service, the GDPR goes further and prescribes that it applies to the processing 
―irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required‖
229
. This way, the 
Regulation stresses on the broad range of services covered by its application – services 
for a fee along with free ones which the information society environment is so abundant 
in. Svantesson is of the opinion that extension of the GDPR to free of charge goods and 
services is significant in the online environment
230
. Barlag takes the same view and 
notes that it is principally oriented towards international companies which offer their 
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services on the Internet
231
. Indeed, the change aims at paying attention to the fact that 
not only offering of those goods and services that are subject to fee must be 
accompanied with processing in the GDPR-compliant manner, but also those goods and 
services that do not require payment by a data subject in the Union. 
The GDPR repeatedly refers to one of the types of services – the information society 
services
232
, however, does not define their place among the services offered by the non-
EU controllers and processors. In this respect, the EDPB helpfully confirms that 
‗offering of services‘ implicates the information society services as well
233
. According 
to Directive (EU) 2015/1535, an information society service is any service provided ―at 
a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of 
services‖
234
. So, basically, information society services encompass all sorts of services 
that can be sent by the non-EU controllers and processors and received by data subjects 
in the Union by means of the Internet or other types of connections enabling provision 
of services at a distance, that is to say, ―by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other 
electromagnetic means‖
235
. As it follows, provision of information society services is 
not restricted by the means of transmission of data in their typical image, i. e., the 
Internet. 
3.5.2. Offering requirements 
a) offering has to be specific  
There are certain general criteria indicating that a non-EU controller or processor 
intentionally targets data subjects in the Union by offering goods or services to them.   
In the first place, this will be the case when the EU individuals are specified, 
distinguished
236
, categorized, referred to a certain group of people or some other way 
specifically mentioned so that it is clear enough that a non-EU entity targets namely 
those customers who are located in the Union
237
. For instance, formulations like ‗youth 
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from the Nordic countries‘, ‗guides and scouts of the EU‘, ‗German and Polish 
volleyball teams‘ and so forth, if used by the non-EU entities in the description of goods 
and services they provide, will clearly confirm that namely those groups of individuals 
in the Union are intentionally targeted from the third country. 
Another general indication of the EU-oriented offering is connected to the specific 
targeting through advertising
238
. In the given example, not individuals are a determining 
factor, but a place or territory in the Union – country, city, college, park, gym, library, 
concert hall etc., – any location where a non-EU controller or processor can place an 
advertisement of its goods or services. Even though this criterion of intentional offering 
differs from the one discussed above, however, the result is the same – the attained goal 
to reach data subjects in the Union. As just shown, in both instances, the criterion of 
specific offering served as a determinant – the specifically mentioned EU individuals or 
the specific advertising in the EU territory.  
By contrast, the less specific offering is, the less probably it will be ascertained as 
targeting individuals in the EU. For instance, a job offer on the Internet that is directed 
at ‗candidates with good command of English‘ undoubtedly concerns not only native 
speakers in the Union, but everyone who meets the requirement. For the reason of being 
too general, the said requirement cannot serve indication of the intentional targeting of 
the EU data subjects
239
.  
Even if considering some other EU language which is not that common as English, for 
instance, Greek, the outcome will not change much. Apparently, the lion‘s share of 
people speaking Greek live in Greece and Cyprus, however, an offer without any 
connection to territory and targeting job seekers ‗with good command of Greek‘ 
concerns at the very least and in particular the Greek-speaking diaspora from all around 
the world. Thereby even having obvious ex facte connection with the Union is often not 
enough to prove targeting. Consequently, the criterion will be dismissed at all times if it 
is too general and does not allow connecting it exclusively with the EU. 
b) offering needs to be accompanied with the processing related to it 
Even if targeting the distinguished individuals in the Union with subsequent processing 
of their personal data, it does not necessarily invoke application of Article 3(2)(a) 
GDPR. This may particularly be the case when the processing of the employees‘ 
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personal data is under consideration. Therefore, the situations which involve personal 
data of the employees deserve separate consideration, especially with regard to those 
employees that are ―highly mobile‖
240
, for instance, due to business trips. Notably, it 
does not mean that in this context employees have to be rendered as a special category 
of data subjects – quite the reverse, they should be treated like any other data subjects, 
irrespective of legal status. However, the nature of the processing activities that concern 
the personal data of the employees requires deeper analysis.  
In the instances on the matter provided by the EDPB, one of which concerned the US 
employees on a business trip to the EU countries and the other one – residents of the EU 
whose employer located in Monaco, the processing in both cases was considered as 
―specifically connected to persons on the territory of the Union‖
241
. Indeed, the 
processing activities conducted by the employer companies concerned the concrete data 
subjects, and the latter were physically present in the EU Member States. So, 
apparently, the condition of targeting of the distinguished individuals in the Union was 
met.   
With respect to the processing activities conducted by the non-EU employers, they 
constituted solely the employment-related purposes, such as salary payments and human 
resources management. Despite having the processing at place and despite targeting 
specific data subjects in the Union, there was no offer of a service to the said data 
subjects established. As the EDPB underlined, the processing at stake did not ―relate to 
an offer of a service to those individuals, but rather [was] part of the processing 
necessary for the employer to fulfil its contractual obligation and human resources 
duties‖
242
. Indeed, ‗being away on business‘ cannot be equated to ‗being offered a 
service‘, or, to put it even more differently, ‗being offered to go on a business trip‘ 
(meaning that it is an honour for an employee due to being chosen among other co-
workers) still will not be regarded as an ‗offer of a service‘, – the employee will act 
within his or her professional duties. The same logic applies to salary which de facto is 
a reward for doing work. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the targeting test was 
not passed. 
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The analysed cases cast light upon some unobvious details and remind about already 
contemplated ones. First of all, the targeting test, as shown in paragraph 3.3 of the paper 
hereinbefore, requires, in particular, that processing must relate to an offer of goods or 
services. Also, data processing can take place in connection with one of the legitimate 
grounds
243
 that allow it happen, e. g., performance of a contract, however, not relate to 
an offering of goods or services. Finally, processing of personal data related to 
employment matters does not foresee per se any offers of goods or services to the 
employees, therefore, it cannot invoke application of Article 3(2)(a) GDPR. 
c) offering has to target individuals in the Union ab origin 
Although much has already been discussed about the data subjects in the Union in 
subchapter 3.4 of the paper hereinbefore, few more words need to be said in the context 
of offering, especially offering of services. The thing is that the provision of services 
and the concomitant data processing usually consist of repeated episodes, unlike the 
provision of goods. Therefore, provision of a service can be time-spaced which leads to 
various circumstances at different stages. 
Arguably, any processing related to an offer of a service that takes place in the EU is 
subject to the Regulation on the basis of targeting principle. Obviously, it cannot be so. 
One of the reasons lies in the initial location of individuals that were targeted by the 
non-EU controller or processor. If the data subjects were offered a service outside the 
Union, and the said service was directed exclusively to the residents of the non-EU 
countries, then, even in case of their subsequent visit of the Union and the use of that 
service from the territory of the EU, the offer will remain targeting the non-EU 
individuals. The possibility of continuing to use the service in the Union does not 
change the fact that the service still targets individuals in the third states only. In such 
case, an important factor is that the targeted data subjects remain the same – no new 
ones from the EU added. 
Moreover, even though the targeted individuals that came to the EU become in fact 
‗individuals in the Union‘, i. e., the category which is necessary for the applicability of 
the targeting principle, however, the GDPR will not apply to such processing since there 
was no preceding intentional targeting of individuals in the Union. By contrast, there 
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occurred targeting of data subjects outside the Union, and this fact is unchangeable 
irrespective of the subsequent entering the EU by the said individuals.
244
 
A typical illustration of such case may be banking sphere. For instance, Ukrainian bank 
Privatbank offers 147 various services through its application Privat24
245
. In order to 
use the application, an individual needs to have a bank account in Privatbank. So, only 
those who have such bank accounts are targeted by the offer, namely residents of 
Ukraine. When a user of application goes on vacation to the EU, he or she continues 
using the application on his or her mobile phone. The processing related to such offer of 
service will not become subject to Article 3(2)(a) GDPR since the offer was ab origin 
directed only at customers from Ukraine. 
With respect to offering of goods, such situation is improbable (though not impossible) 
since goods as such are intended for one-time provision, thus, they normally are not 
supplied partly outside the EU first and then complemented within the EU. 
Nevertheless, if the circumstances happen to be as just described, the outcome will 
remain the same as in case of offering of services – the offer directed at individuals in 
the third states will not invoke the targeting principle, even if the targeted data subjects 
enter the Member States of the Union. 
d) offering requires intention 
Recital 23 in the preamble to the GDPR explains that a non-EU controller or processor 
will be considered offering goods or services to data subjects in the EU under the 
stipulation that ―it is apparent that the controller or processor envisages offering 
services to data subjects in one or more Member States in the Union‖
246
 (emphases 
added). In fact, this should mean that the Regulation applies only when a non-EU entity 
intends to offer goods or services to data subjects in the EU. However, the way the 
legislator has stipulated that in recital 23 does not allow making such straightforward 
conclusions. 
To understand better the logic behind the analysed guidance from the recital, the case 
law on the matter should be addressed. In Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof joined cases, the 
CJEU observed that it is necessary to determine availability of the ―evidence 
demonstrating that the trader was envisaging doing business with consumers […] in the 
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sense that it was minded to conclude a contract with those consumers‖
247
 (emphases 
added). Obviously, most of the elements provided in the given judgment were adopted 
and embodied into the GDPR. However, one which is utterly important – evidence 
demonstrating intention – was not included into the text of the Regulation. One may 
argue that referring to the wording ―it is apparent …‖ is an equivalent of ‗evidence‘, 
however, what is apparent or is not so depends on one‘s subjective perception, unlike 
what constitutes evidence is determined by law. Therefore, it is suggested that by 
rephrasing the CJEU‘s judgment, which indubitably was taken as a basis for the 
respective guidance in the GDPR, its real meaning was distorted, thus, it is not possible 
to rely on recital 23 in full. 
As Svantesson rightly observed, by stating that the non-EU controller or processor has 
to envisage offering, the legislator had made ―the focus on subjective targeting, as 
opposed to objective targeting‖
248
. In scholar‘s opinion, such formulation implies 
nothing else but ―what is in the mind of the controller or processor that matters‖ by 
contrast with whether targeting takes place objectively
249
. Indeed, measuring the non-
EU controllers‘ or processors‘ intention of offering in a way of relying on their 
forethoughts and considerations is quite unreasonable and far from the legal approach 
that requires factual reasoning. Therefore, bearing in mind the GDPR‘s goals and 
principles, it is suggested to interpret given recommendation not literally, but broadly. 
The idea of objective targeting was also supported by Granmar who stressed on the 
need to rely on objective facts and not on ―the actual state of mind of a person‖
250
. 
Objective targeting implies that offering activities include an objective intention of the 
non-EU operator to direct its activities to data subjects in the Union, and this intention is 
manifested through objective evidences (contemplated closely in paragraph 3.5.3 of the 
paper). Thus, what the non-EU entity indeed envisaged is not decisive, moreover, it 
cannot be determined or checked objectively. On the contrary, the absence of evidences 
showing the intention to offer will speak of the impossibility to apply the targeting 
principle. 
By contrast to the requirement stating that the offering has to be made intentionally in 
order to apply Article 3(2)(a) GDPR, the unintentional offering will not, respectively, 
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invoke the provision in question. With regard to this observation, the EDPB has added 
an interesting note to the finalized version of the Guidelines in which it states that if 
―goods or services are inadvertently or incidentally provided‖ to data subjects in the 
Union, the Regulation will not apply to the respective processing
251
. Basically, it means 
that even though the processing of personal data occurred, however, on condition that 
there was no intention to target, the non-EU entity will not fall under the GDPR.  
On the one hand, this, indeed, may be the case if, for example, a website of the non-EU 
controller or processor is accessible from the Member State and, by virtue of that, the 
website was accessed and a service was provided to the data subject located within the 
Union. However, since there was no intention to offer services to the individuals in the 
EU, the mere accessibility will not lead to application of the targeting principle. That is 
what the EDPB most likely implicates by referring to the situations when goods or 
services are provided unintentionally or accidentally. 
On the other hand, the mentioned above observation from the EDPB does not seem to 
clarify anything or solve an issue. On the contrary, it raises even more issues. First of 
all, it exempts the non-EU controllers and processors from liability if they prove that the 
provision of goods or services took place unintentionally. As noted hereinbefore, this 
matter cannot be checked objectively. So, the non-EU entities are going to invoke the 
exemption every time when willing to escape the applicability of the targeting principle 
to them. Secondly, the grounds of exemption from liability – ―inadvertently or 
incidentally provided‖ goods or services – create a loophole on default as long as the 
existence of the said grounds greatly depends on whether the non-EU entities 
themselves acknowledge the intention of offering. This is an additional argument for 
why the objective targeting including all respective objective evidences should have 
been focused on by the legislator and should always be checked in practice in order to 
determine whether Article 3(2)(a) applies to the processing. 
3.5.3. Objective evidences of directing activities at the individuals in the Union 
As previously noted, the concept of directing activities should be consulted when 
evaluating the evidences of offering goods or services to the data subjects in the 
Union
252
. Furthermore, in support of the given approach, Granmar suggests that in times 
of universal digitalization the concept of offering goods or services should mean the 
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same as ―directing commercial offers to consumers‖, implicating that the majority of 
offers are commercial
253
. Putting it this way, commercial offering equates to promotion 
which, in turn, brings it closer to targeting as a goal. Therefore, evidences used in the 
concept of directing of activities can be capable of affirming ‗offering of goods or 
services‘ too, however, with a proviso. 
First of all, judgment in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof joined cases, which is a mine of 
information about evidences of directing and due to this should be consulted as the main 
and original source, was answering the question regarding activities directed via a 
website
254
, while offering of goods and services, pursuant to Article 3(2)(a) GDPR, is 
not limited to the Internet offers. Secondly, as Advocate General Trstenjak has inferred 
in her Opinion, Article 15(1)(c) of Brussels I Regulation
255
, which was interpreted by 
the CJEU in the cases mentioned above, implies that ―an undertaking must direct its 
activities to a particular Member State and not to a particular group of consumers‖
256
.  
By contrast, under Article 3(2)(a) GDPR, the activities are being directed to data 
subjects in the Union which can be defined particularly as a group of people, though 
referring to the whole Member State is not excluded. 
As appears from the above, the GDPR has wider scope of application in comparison 
with Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof joined cases, i. e., it is applicable both to online and 
offline activities. In addition, unlike the interpreted provision, the Regulation allows 
directing activities not only to a certain Member State (meaning its residents) but also at 
certain groups of people within the Union. These observations allow inferring that 
practically all indices of directing that were addressed in the judgment as well as in 
Opinion of Advocate General can to certain extent be applicable to concept of offering 
within the meaning of Article 3(2)(a) GDPR, though the EDPB has selected not all of 
them to include into Guidelines.  
Furthermore, there may be other evidences of directing the existence of which is 
conditional on objective impossibility to foresee everything, so, in any case, the list of 
indices is not exhaustive
257
. It is worth noting that the availability of just one evidence 
may be insufficient to ascertain a non-EU controller‘s intention of offering goods or 
                                                          
253
 Granmar 2019, pp. 36-37 
254
 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof joined cases, para 24(2) 
255
 Article 15(1)(c) Brussels I Regulation: ―[..] the contract has been concluded with a person who […] 
directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including that Member State […]‖ 
256
 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, para 82 
257
 Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof joined cases, para 93 
66 
 
services to individuals in the Union, nevertheless, it will depend on the facts of a 
concrete case
258
. So, as a general recommendation, it is suggested that the more factors 
of offering are ascertained, the better. In the following paragraphs, this paper will 
contemplate possible evidences of directing, however, due to the limits of the paper, 
only those indices which require deeper analysis will be discussed in detail. 
a) the use of a language or a currency of one or more EU Member States 
If a non-EU controller uses on its website a language or a currency of one or more 
Member States of the Union, this fact may indicate that the said non-EU entity directs 
its activities to the EU data subjects. Ideal example of such evidence would be a 
language that is official only in one EU Member State and nowhere else, and spoken by 
relatively few people
259
, such as Estonian or Latvian. 
The use of a language or a currency can be put into effect either by means of writing the 
website in the particular language, i. e., the website‘s interface is available to users in 
certain language, or provision of the facility with the help of which the EU currency or 
EU Member State language can be switched to
260
. In addition to the said attributes, 
offering may be expressed through ―the possibility of ordering goods and services‖
261
 or 
―making and confirming the reservation‖ using the said language and currency
262
. 
The use of a language 
The EDPB‘s clarification that a language or a currency has to be ―other than that 
generally used in the trader‟s country‖
263
 (emphases added) is inaccurate and too 
generalized since it suggests languages and currencies of any third countries with 
respect to the non-EU entity‘s country, including EU Member States, however, not only 
them. Thus, for the sake of clarity, it seems more rational to shift stress onto the 
condition that a language or a currency must be, first, of one of the EU Member States, 
and only then, second, different from that generally used one in the country where the 
non-EU entity is established. However, as will be shown hereinafter, the second 
condition may sometimes be absent. 
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In the event when a generally used in a non-EU country language coincides with a 
language of the European Union, it becomes difficult to show the non-EU controller‘s 
intention of targeting individuals in the EU. For instance, in India, English has status of 
the subsidiary official language
264
, while in the EU, English is one of the official 
languages in Malta and Ireland
265
. It appears from this that the Indian controller may 
potentially be considered directing its activities at data subjects in Malta or Ireland 
without being aware of it. However, the legislator has envisaged such situation by 
stating that ―the use of a language generally used in the third country where the 
controller is established, is insufficient‖
266
 for rendering it as targeting the EU. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the non-EU controller will fall under exemption 
from the rule, – rather, additional evidences of directing will need to be provided. 
On the surface, the analysed factor and its applicability do not cause difficulties. 
However, if to dig deeper, more questions arise. Recital 23 in the preamble to the 
GDPR defines the sai d index of offering as ―the use of a language or a currency 
generally used in one or more Member States‖
267
 (emphasis added). At the same time, 
the Regulation does not explain when a language or a currency is considered ‗generally 
used‘. Presumably, it should be equated to ‗official‘, thus, meaning official languages 
and currencies of the EU. If addressing the EDPB Guidelines on the matter, they 
interpret the said provisions as ―a language or currency of one or more EU Member 
states‖
268
. Notably, the Guidelines exemplify the situations in which only the official 
languages of the Union are concerned. Nevertheless, the formulation ‗language of a 
Member State‘ suggests thinking that it means either the official language or any other 
language recognized at the national level of a Member State, e. g., the regional and 
minority languages. Though, this is only an assumption since it is neither affirmed by 
existing examples nor refuted by authorities. 
Such conclusion derives also from the GDPR‘s orientation towards ‗data subjects in the 
Union‘ who do not necessarily constitute the main population of a Member State. That 
is to say, referring to French people when addressing France or, by mentioning 
Germany implicating Germans only, is not true anymore. On the contrary, ‗data subjects 
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in the Union‘ can be a minority that does not even constitute the indigenous inhabitants 
of the country, but is its current population. So, on the basis of such logic, there are no 
obstacles for why not to understand the analysed provision as meaning ‗languages 
spoken by people inhabiting a Member State‘. Furthermore, as already mentioned 
hereinbefore, offering of goods and services may be addressed to a particular group of 
people in the Union. 
In this respect, Karaduman exemplifies the situation when Turkish company, whose 
website is in Turkish only, targets Turkish-speaking individuals who live in 
Germany
269
. In Karaduman‘s view, despite the fact that Turkish is not the official 
language of the Union, the company still will be subject to the provisions of the 
GDPR
270
. This hypothetical case may actually be solved with either of the two 
following scenarios. According to the first one, the Turkish language per se cannot be 
considered appropriate language according to the Regulation since it is not one of the 
languages of the EU Member States in any case. So, there will be no targeting of data 
subjects in the Union established. Moreover, if to rely on the EDPB‘s Guidelines, 
Turkish is inappropriate doubly due to being a generally used language in the 
company‘s country which is Turkey. Pursuant to the second scenario, Turkish language 
still might be considered proper evidence, but only in combination with other weightier 
arguments of offering, if such are available. In this case, the non-EU language may 
serve as a secondary, auxiliary evidence which in combination with other factors would 
strengthen the established ones. In any event, Turkish language cannot be used as the 
only and independent evidence of offering. Finally, in the context of the instance at 
stake, it appears unreasonable that the EDPB excludes the use of a language generally 
used in the non-EU entity‘s country since, as just shown, situations when a website 
written in language A targets individuals in the Union who speak the same language A 
are more than feasible. 
The use of a currency 
As regards the use of a currency of one or more EU Member States, everything is more 
or less clear. Euro is the official currency of 19 EU Member States
271
. Thus, if a non-EU 
website indicates prices in euros or provides the possibility to choose currency from the 
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list which includes euro in particular, this proves that the website is indubitably oriented 
towards customers from the Union.  
Notably, euro is used also in few other European countries which are not members of 
the EU, such as Andorra, Kosovo, Montenegro, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican 
City
272
. Hence, in some cases, despite the use of euro, a non-EU entity may be targeting 
the non-EU individuals, – the circumstances need to be evaluated in the light of other 
evidences of directing. Nevertheless, it seems highly probable that the intentional 
targeting of the Union still might be confirmed because of the following factors: small 
size of the said non-EU countries, their neighbourhood to the Union, namely proximity 
to the eurozone, and, of course, the use of euro by them.  
With respect to the other currencies of the European Union, they are not so widespread 
as euro, moreover, their usage is limited to one single country. For instance, Hungarian 
forint or Swedish krona are the official currencies only in the respective countries. 
Therefore, indication of such currencies by a non-EU entity would be a weighty 
argument for directing activities to a concrete EU Member State. Notably, the same 
concerns also if a non-EU website uses currencies of Iceland, Liechtenstein or Norway. 
b) the use of a top-level domain name that refers to the EU or a Member State 
The Guidelines provided by the EDPB are somewhat misleading due to their 
generalized formulation: ―The use of a top-level domain name other than that of the 
third country in which the controller or processor is established, […]‖
273
 (emphasis 
added). This way, any third country with respect to a non-EU state is covered by the 
guideline, including EU Member States, however, not only them. To avoid ambiguity, 
this paragraph, as specified in the headline, will contemplate the use of a top-level 
domain name that refers to the EU or a Member State. 
In general, a top-level domain (hereinafter – TLD) is the last part of a domain name, or, 
to be more precise, the letters in an Internet address which come after the final dot
274
. 
For instance, ‗.com‘, ‗.net‘, ‗.au‘, ‗.edu‘ etc. One of the purposes of a TLD can be 
indication of the geographical area where the website refers to. Therefore, a TLD may 
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potentially point out that certain offer of goods or services targets data subjects in the 
Union. However, of course, not any type of TLD is suitable for that. 
Country-code top-level domain name 
A TLD that identifies a particular country is called a country-code top-level domain 
(hereinafter – ccTLD). It consists of two letters and corresponds to a country, territory, 
or other geographic location
275
. Each Member State of the EU has its own unique 
ccTLD name, e. g., ‗.fi‘ (Finland), ‗.se‘ (Sweden). Also, some territories of the EU, such 
as islands, have their own ccTLDs, e. g., ‗.ax‘ (Åland Islands), ‗.fo‘ (Faroe Islands). 
Interestingly, the TLD name ‗.eu‘ (EU) was set forth by the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) on the ccTLDs list as well, though the EU is not a country
276
. In view 
of the aforesaid, both Member States‘ TLDs and EU‘s TLD belong to the category of 
ccTLDs. The List of ccTLDs
277
 should be consulted when taking into consideration ―the 
use of a TLD name‖ factor. 
As Advocate General Trstenjak noted in her Opinion in joined cases Pammer and Hotel 
Alpenhof, the mentioning of the TLD name of a Member State clearly indicates that the 
entity directs its activities to the Member State whose TLD name it uses. This is 
especially relevant in cases when a legal person with its place of establishment in one 
country uses the TLD name of another country where it is not established.
278
 Therefore, 
if, for example, an entity established in China sets up a website with the ccTLD name 
‗.de‘, it is obvious that the entity addresses customers located in Germany. 
Generic (geographic) top-level domain name 
Besides ccTLDs, there may be other indicators of referring to the Member States – the 
generic TLDs that refer to the cities of the Member States, e. g., ‗.barcelona‘, ‗.berlin‘, 
‗.helsinki‘, ‗.london‘, ‗.paris‘ and so forth. Though a city-level TLD (hereinafter – 
clTLD) does not embrace as many potential customers as a ccTLD does, nevertheless, 
first, it is easily recognizable since it usually copies the city‘s name in full, and, second, 
the cities using such TLDs are either capitals or other popular tourist destinations, 
which altogether actually makes the clTLDs equally top with ccTLDs. Therefore, it is 
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proper to give full weight to the clTLDs as well when considering whether offer of 
goods or services occurred. 
There is one more group of geographic TLDs – the ones related to specific region of the 
EU and its culture. For instance, ‗.bzh‘ (Brittany, France) is intended for Breton 
language and culture, ‗.cat‘ (Catalonia, Spain) – for Catalan language and culture, 
‗.irish‘ (Ireland) – for global Irish community
279
 etc. Undoubtedly, the fact of using any 
of such TLDs speaks in favor of targeting people belonging to that specific local 
culture. 
As just shown, generic (geographic) TLDs may also refer to certain Member States or 
territories. Therefore, the List of generic TLDs
280
 should be consulted along with the 
List of ccTLDs, when taking into consideration ―the use of a TLD name‖ factor. 
Redirection 
Irrespectively of the primary TLD name of the website, the latter still can be caught by 
the GDPR. This situation is possible, if the said website redirects customers located in 
the EU to the website with a TLD name that corresponds to their IP geolocation data
281
. 
For instance, a customer from Sweden visits the website ‗example.com‘, however, he is 
redirected to ‗example.com/se‘ which is a Swedish TLD name. In this case, the website 
has located the position of the customer and, since it has the separate TLD for Swedish 
users, the redirection occurred automatically. Alternatively, the redirection could 
happen manually, if the customer had a possibility of choosing or was offered to choose 
(e. g., by means of a pop-up window) his country from the menu of the website and so 
was redirected to ‗example.com/se‘.
282
 In any case, having the separate TLD name for 
customers from the Member States speaks in favour of targeting data subjects in the EU 
by the non-EU based entities. 
TLDs with commercial licenses 
In fact, TLDs with commercial licenses are just that very way of how the non-EU 
companies obtain the EU-based TLDs. The said TLDs are opened to worldwide 
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registrations for commercial use
283
 and have no other connection with the country of 
origin of the TLD. For example, clTLD ‗.london‘ is officially opened not only to 
Londoners, but up to everyone
284
.  
Even though it seems obvious that a website using ccTLD of a certain country targets 
customers in that particular country, however, there is more here than meets the eye. 
According to Svantesson, sometimes, the choice of TLD is made in order ―to achieve a 
play with words rather than as an attempt at attracting customers‖
285
 of the certain 
market. For instance, Spanish ccTLD ‗.es‘ may be used for forming plural words in the 
TLD names, e. g., ‗parti.es‘, ‗famili.es‘
286
; Belgian ccTLD ‗.be‘ is used as a link 
shortener in the name of YouTube site ‗youtu.be‘
287
, or simply for the literal term ‗be‘ 
and so forth. In such cases, the non-EU based entity using Member States‘ TLDs cannot 
be considered to target the EU customers. Therefore, not only the TLD name itself has 
to be taken into account, but the whole Internet domain name as well, and, as 
Svantesson correctly noted, the true impact of the choice of TLD must be assessed
288
. 
c) the mention of geographical addresses or telephone numbers to be reached from 
an EU country 
According to recital 23 in the preamble to the GDPR, ―the mere accessibility of the […] 
website in the Union, of an email address or of other contact details‖ (emphasis added) 
is not sufficient to assert that the non-EU controller or processor intends to offer goods 
or services to data subjects in the Union
289
. Apparently, ‗other contact details‘ implicate 
geographical addresses, telephone numbers and all other sorts of means of 
communication, mainly the Internet-based ones. Everything what concerns the Internet 
contact details, such as the email addresses, links to the social platforms or messengers, 
indeed cannot indicate the intention of offering since those contact details are universal 
and target everyone, not just the EU data subjects. 
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With respect to the addresses (in geographical meaning) and the telephone numbers, the 
situation is twofold. On the one hand, both are lacking an ‗intention‘ feature, on the 
other hand, it depends on the format how they are provided. In general, addresses and 
telephone numbers can be either in a simplified format, or in an international one. While 
in a simplified version only the name of the city and the street address are sufficient 
since such address is obviously oriented towards the locals, the preconditions of the 
international format include the country‘s and the district‘s or region‘s names along 
with the postal code in addition, thus, allowing people from different corners of the 
globe to find it. Thereby simplified version of a geographical address surely cannot be 
deemed as targeting the EU data subjects. As regards an international address, it per se 
potentially aims at the whole world, however, whether it particularly targets the Union 
has to be evaluated together with other existing factors of directing activities since taken 
alone it would be, though appropriate, but insufficient evidence. 
A much alike system takes place in case of telephone numbers. Each country has its 
own international calling code
290
 with a help of which the international calls are 
possible. By analogy with addresses, if a telephone number is provided in a shorter 
format usable for local calls only, then, apparently, a non-EU controller or processor 
expects calls from the same country or city where it is established. However, the 
international format of the telephone number speaks in favour of offering goods or 
services to customers from abroad – very likely, including the EU data subjects as well, 
which must be assessed in combination with other factors. 
Notably, recital 23, which is set forth above, does not specify what format of ‗other 
contact details‘ are implied, i. e., simplified (short) or international ones, – rather, it 
stresses on the insufficiency of evidence if just one factor is present. Nevertheless, the 
EDPB interprets the said recital as if meaning insufficiency in case of a ―telephone 
number without an international code‖
291
. This explanation suggests an idea that, on the 
contrary, a telephone number with an international code would be considered sufficient 
evidence of offering. However, as shown above, it will not be so since other suitable 
factors must be at place as well. It seems that the EDPB has taken the given citation out 
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of context from judgment in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof joined cases
292
, in which it 
actually makes sense, and misled into thinking of ambiguity in the Regulation. 
Nevertheless, it should be observed that another EDPB‘s clarification is right to the 
point – it has suggested putting the factor under consideration more specifically into the 
EU plane, namely by construing it as ―[t]he mention of dedicated addresses or phone 
numbers to be reached from an EU country‖
293
. That is to say, if a non-EU controller or 
processor assigns, for example, a separate telephone number for calls from the territory 
of the Union, that will be an incontroverted evidence of targeting the EU data subjects. 
The same concerns the mention of address where specifically the EU customers are 
served. 
In spite of the fact that the EDPB for some reason avoids acknowledging the 
international format of contact details as an appropriate evidence of offering, there are 
no obstacles to its acceptance. Moreover, international format of telephone numbers, in 
particular, was recognized admissible evidence of ‗directing activities‘ in Pammer and 
Hotel Alpenhof joined cases
294
 that have served as a basis for criteria of offering within 
the meaning of the GDPR. So, there are two cases when a non-EU controller‘s or 
processor‘s geographical address or telephone number may indicate an intention to offer 
goods or services to the data subjects in the Union: contact details either in an 
international format or specifically dedicated to data subjects from the EU. Even though 
it seems obvious that the second case would be a stronger evidence of offering, 
however, both examples may equally serve in proving offering. 
d) other evidences of directing 
There are many other factors of directing activities at the data subjects in the Union, 
and, as already noted, the list is not exhaustive. Some of them are contemplated 
hereinafter. 
Naturally, when a non-EU controller directly states on the website that its business 
activities are oriented towards the EU market, or if it designates by name a Member 
State or the EU in general, notably ―with reference to the good or service offered‖
295
, 
then undoubtedly its offering activities target the EU. By virtue of specifying the target 
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groups of consumers, the non-EU entity confirms that it targets objectively as well as 
demonstrates its intention via the subjective targeting. Also, if the EU Member States 
are listed among the countries where the non-EU controller delivers goods to, the 
possibility of delivery to the Union clearly indicates that the offers are directed to the 
EU Member States
296
. 
Not only the particular EU countries can be indicated as the target audience, but also the 
specifically mentioned customers and users in the Union
297
, as already discussed in 
paragraph 3.5.2 (a) of the paper hereinbefore. There are various indices showing that the 
non-EU entity engages in transactions with the European customers. For instance, 
―presentation of accounts written by such customers‖
298
 demonstrates that those 
individuals have registered their accounts on the website and, thus, sent their personal 
data, or publication of testimonials written by the EU customers
299
 shows that the non-
EU entity has previously offered goods or services to the customers from the Union. 
The much alike role would play the customers‘ reviews of the products left on the 
website. Also, Advocate General Trstenjak considers that provision of the ―facility […] 
to subscribe to a newsletter about the goods and services offered‖ serves an indicator 
that the non-EU entity ―consciously [works] towards concluding distance contracts with 
consumers‖
300
. In fact, subscription to a newsletter is a half way for a non-EU entity 
towards conclusion of a contract with a consumer, but what is more important, it is 
already acknowledged as an directing of its offers at the EU individuals. 
The EDPB takes the same view as the CJEU
301
 and considers that the international 
nature of the non-EU entity‘s activities, especially tourist activities, may be taken into 
consideration when evaluating factors of directing
302
. Trstenjak does not object to what 
regards tourist activities, however, suggests that the type of activities in general cannot 
be a determining factor, therefore, the activities should be evaluated without prejudice 
to their nature, for instance, craft activities do not necessarily target only customers 
living in the nearby areas
303
 since products of craft activities can be delivered to the 
Union. So, in fact, any type of activities can be considered international if it allows 
reaching people in the EU.  
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If a non-EU entity provides guidance, namely itineraries, on how an EU individual can 
get from a particular Member State to the place where the service offered by the said 
entity is provided
304
, then such entity works actively and intentionally towards targeting 
the EU customers. The guidance may include various travelling instructions, for 
example, how to get from the airport to the city in the non-EU country of destination. 
Last, but not least, are evidences of directing aiming at promotion of the non-EU 
controller‘s or processor‘s activities in order to reach the EU market. Such evidences 
envisage ―marketing and advertisement campaigns‖
305
 of every sort and kind, including 
advertising by means of the Internet, television, radio, newspapers and so forth
306
. Also, 
the CJEU considers expenses on an internet referencing service relevant in the situations 
when a non-EU controller or processor pays for making its website accessible for the 
customers from the Union; such promotion clearly demonstrates the non-EU entity‘s 
intention of targeting the EU individuals
307
. 
3.6. Monitoring data subjects’ behaviour in the Union 
3.6.1. The concept of monitoring 
The monitoring criterion is an innovative concept in the applicability of EU data 
protection law308, and, despite the skepticism regarding its effective operability
309
, it has 
already made the breakthrough by extending its sphere of influence onto the whole 
Internet. Furthermore, the scope of monitoring criterion is even broader than the 
offering of goods or services criterion since it is likely to cover all sorts of online as 
well as offline activities310. Indeed, the wording of Article 3(2)(b) GDPR allows 
inferring that the offline behaviour is not excepted from the provision. Nevertheless, as 
de Hert and Czerniawski rightly observe, the monitoring criterion was primarily 
projected to capture ―third country operators of social networks, online providers of 
services such as e-mail accounts, operators of search engines and websites‖, many of 
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which monitor the users‘ behaviour on the Internet on continuing basis
311
. Finally, since 
Article 3(2)(b) GDPR captures wider range of grounds for the applicability of the 
Regulation, it will most likely catch those non-EU operators who target the EU, 
however, managed to bypass the grounds found in Article 3(2)(a) GDPR.  
The monitoring criterion is stipulated in Article 3(2)(b) GDPR which states that a non-
EU controller or processor can be subject to the Regulation provisions if its data 
processing is related to the monitoring of the data subjects‘ behaviour “as far as their 
behaviour takes place within the Union” (emphasis added)
312
. By putting it this way, 
the legislator expressly excludes the cases where there is insufficient link between the 
non-EU operator‘s processing activities and the Union. That is to say, the monitoring 
criterion cannot apply to the processing, for example, simply on the basis that it is 
related to an EU resident
313
. In this context, the EDPB clarifies that ―the behaviour 
monitored must first relate to a data subject in the Union and, as a cumulative criterion, 
the monitored behaviour must take place within the territory of the Union‖
314
. As it 
follows, the monitored behaviour is brought into the forefront since it appears as a 
common denominator of a data subject in the Union and the place where the behaviour 
occurs. 
Recital 24 in the preamble to the GDPR states that for the finding that the processing 
―can be considered to monitor‖ the EU data subjects‘ behaviour, it is necessary to 
inquire into ―whether natural persons are tracked on the internet including potential 
subsequent use of personal data processing techniques‖
315
. Thus, the Regulation regards 
monitoring as an activity which envisages the data processing. Furthermore, as 
previously stated in paragraph 3.4.3 of the paper hereinbefore, monitoring as such 
consists of targeting as well as data processing
316
, so, monitoring cannot be considered 
separately from these elements. 
With respect to the EDPB, it focuses on the subjective part of the explanation and 
defines ‗monitoring‘ as meaning that ―the controller has a specific purpose in mind for 
the collection and subsequent reuse of the relevant data about an individual‘s behaviour 
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within the EU‖
317
 (emphases added). Leaving aside at this point the types of activities 
that the said explanation implies, it is suggested to examine ‗monitoring‘ from the data 
processing perspective
318
. Even though ‗monitoring‘ is not found in the list of 
processing operations set out in Article 4(2) GDPR, nevertheless, it seems obvious that 
it should be there. As stated above in the definition, monitoring consists of the 
collection and reuse of personal data, both of which refer to the data processing 
operations
319
. So, basically, ‗monitoring‘ is a compound operation that includes two 
steps: first, collection of data and, second, its subsequent use (or reuse). This 
ascertainment allows considering monitoring not only as a targeting activity, but also as 
a full-fledged processing, bearing in mind that it consists of two indispensable steps. 
In some forms of monitoring, there may be additional, that it to say interim, steps 
presented. For instance, in the illustration of profiling activities, provided in 
Recommendation of Council of Europe, it was clarified that profiling includes three 
stages: first, data collection and storage that altogether constitute data warehousing, 
second, automated analysis in order to identify correlation between various behaviours 
– a so-called ‗data mining‘, and, third, applying the correlation results to a particular 
data subject in order ―to deduce some of his or her past, present or future 
characteristics‖
320
. Thus, using the terminology of the Regulation, namely the list of 
processing operations set out in Article 4(2) GDPR, profiling as a form of monitoring 
involves collection, storage and various forms of data use, such as organization, 
combination or any other similar forms. 
Azzi additionally clarifies the question by noting that the concept of monitoring is 
conditional on the definition of ‗personal data‘ provided in the Regulation, which 
implicates in particular ―personal preferences, interests, location or movements‖
321
 etc. 
In other words, only what refers to ‗personal data‘ and constitutes the data subjects‘ 
behaviour can be monitored. Due to the major focus of the GDPR on the Internet users‘ 
activities with the respective monitoring of their behaviour (the so-called ‗surfing 
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behaviour‘
322
), it is obvious that new types of personal data come to the foreground.      
In this respect, the Regulation singles out the category of online identifiers, among 
which internet protocol (IP) addresses, cookie identifiers and radio frequency 
identification (RFID) tags, since all of them can be utilized for profiling
323
 of the EU 
individuals. 
Summarising all the aforesaid explanations of the scope of monitoring, it appears that 
the concept is quite broad, and various provisions and clarifications complement each 
other. As a result, monitoring appears to refer to all possible types of activities, – both 
online and offline, – which lead to tracking of individuals in the Union and envisage 
―potential subsequent use of personal data processing techniques‖
324
.  
3.6.2. Monitoring requires an intentional purpose 
Passing ahead the then-forthcoming clarification from the EDPB, Svantesson rightly 
observed that unlike Recital 23 (corresponding to Article 3(2)(a) GDPR), which 
helpfully ascertains that the criterion of offering goods or services requires intention on 
the part of a non-EU controller or processor, neither Recital 24 nor any other part of the 
Regulation ―include any expressed such requirement in relation to Article 3(2)(b)‖ 
GDPR
325
. Indeed, related to Article 3(2)(b) Recital 24 is silent about any subjective 
components of monitoring on the part of non-EU operators. Therefore, logically, it is 
possible to assume that since the content of recitals differs, so is their meaning: under 
Article 3(2)(b) GDPR, an ―unintentional monitoring may be caught‖ too
326
 (emphasis 
added). As regards intentional monitoring, it, undoubtedly, is subject to the Regulation 
irrespective of whether this is directly specified so or not. Elaborating on the issue, 
Svantesson further suggests that unintentional monitoring may take place when a non-
EU entity is not going to apply any data processing techniques to the collected data 
related to individuals in the Union
327
, that is to say, the first step which is collection 
occurred, however, since no subsequent use featuring monitoring activities is intended, 
the monitoring criterion cannot be applied. Without other clarifications available, this, 
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indeed, could make sense. However, as shown below, data processing activities under 
the given circumstances of the case cannot be deemed as monitoring. 
Admitting the legislator‘s omission, the EDPB has cleared up the confusion. It agreed 
that none of the provisions ―expressly introduce[s] a necessary degree of ―intention to 
target‖‖
328
, thereby probably implicating that it is necessary to read between lines or 
even think unconventionally (emphasis added). Following the EDPB‘s logic, an 
intention to target was actually implicated, but introduced vaguely. In any case, the 
issue was resolved by providing the definition of ‗monitoring‘ which was discussed 
hereinabove, but this time its another part will be contemplated closely: ―the use of the 
word ―monitoring‖ implies that the controller has a specific purpose in mind for the 
collection and subsequent reuse of the relevant data […]‖
329
 (emphasis added). Taking 
into account all the above-stated, it appears that for the applicability of the monitoring 
criterion it is required that a non-EU entity envisages not just a purpose, but an 
intentional purpose, which is different from the former.  
Interpretation in such light clarifies why Svantesson‘s conjecture is partly inaccurate – 
monitoring must actually be intentional by default, and the lack of will to further use the 
data processing techniques to the collected data demonstrates the absence of intention to 
monitor, which has to be present on the whole way of monitoring activities. Therefore, 
for instance, passive, i. e., without intention, continuing collection of data regarding the 
natural persons‘ behaviour within the Union will not present monitoring
330
. 
Complications with intentional purpose of monitoring do not come to an end at this 
point. Recital 24 in the preamble to the GDPR explains that in order to ascertain that a 
non-EU entity monitors the individuals‘ behaviour within the Union, two things need to 
be established: first, data subjects tracking on the Internet, and, second, ―potential 
subsequent use of personal data processing techniques‖ that envisage profiling of the 
data subjects
331
. While feasibility of the first condition is technically possible, the 
second one is more problematic. If the use of data has already occurred, then there will 
be evidences of profiling – the profiles on data subjects. However, how to check 
potentiality of subsequent data use remains unclear. Gömann argues that such 
construction concerns the subjective intentions of a non-EU entity; as a result, whether 
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the fact of monitoring will be established or not, depends on the non-EU operator‘s 
desire to advance processing to the stage of data use
332
. Without further clarification 
from the authorities, the mere availability of data processing techniques at the disposal 
of a non-EU data controller may lead to the conclusion that it could potentionally use 
them for monitoring activities. Alternatively, it seems rational to take the same 
approach which is used in application of offering criterion, that is to say, ascertaining 
whether a non-EU entity actively demonstrates its intention to target – here: to monitor 
– individuals in the Union. 
Though namely ‗purpose‘ is a distinctive element of the monitoring, it is important to 
remember that monitoring is a form of targeting, therefore, nothing targeting is alien to 
monitoring. To put it differently, the latter has adopted all attributes of targeting, in 
particular ‗targeting as a goal‘
333
. So, intention to target is an equally important 
precondition under both offering criterion and monitoring criterion.  
Purposes for which the non-EU controllers monitor the data subjects‘ behaviour in the 
Union vary. Often they are marketing or advertising and they are directly dependent on 
the monitoring activities. Neither GDPR, nor EDPB Guidelines define the purposes of 
monitoring as such, however, some clarification they do provide. For instance, profiling 
aims at making decisions regarding a particular data subject or analyzing or predicting 
―personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes‖
334
; or another example: a non-EU 
―controller has a specific purpose […]  for the collection and subsequent reuse‖ of 
personal data
335
 (emphases added). The italicized factors are actions that accompany 
and at the same time serve as interim steps towards the ultimate goal which is 
conditional on the factual purpose of monitoring. In other words, activities, such as 
decision-making, analysis, prediction, collection, reuse etc. help non-EU operators to 
realize their real intentions. 
Gömann deems that, due to all difficulties with ascertaining the targeting features of 
monitoring, it will turn out to be merely ―a declaration of political intent‖ in practice
336
. 
Nevertheless, the ICO proved it to be different. It initiated the first enforcement action 
under the GDPR against a data controller based outside the Union which took place on 
24 October 2018. Notably, this was clearly the case when the company had no physical 
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presence, i. e., establishment, in the EU at all. The UK Information Commissioner‘s 
Office (ICO) accused the Canada-based company AggregateIQ Data Services Ltd (AIQ) 
of unlawful using of personal data of the UK data subjects for the purposes of targeting 
them ―with political advertising messages on social media‖
337
, so far as this way AIQ 
monitored the behaviour of individuals in the EU. The case included two Enforcement 
Notices from the ICO. The first Notice contained the reference to Article 3(2)(b) GDPR 
as the grounds of the Regulation‘s applicability to the processing carried out by AIQ
338
. 
However, in the revised version of the Enforcement Notice, which was aimed at 
clarifying ―the steps to be taken by AIQ‖, the said reference to Article 3(2)(b) GDPR 
was removed
339
 for unspecified reason. Nevertheless, this amendment does not seem to 
have changed the grounds the Enforcement Notice was issued against AIQ on.  
It may be argued that enforcement notice is just an act of warning. However, the notice 
informs about the essence of infringement and notifies that, in case of failing to comply 
with it, Comissioner may serve a penalty notice next. So, as it follows, monitoring 
criterion is actually operational. 
3.6.3. Monitoring activities  
Recital 24 in the preamble to the GDPR provides somewhat misleading guidance since, 
in the context of contemplating what activities the monitoring consists of, the legislator 
confined itself to mentioning only tracking on the Internet
340
. However, as Ustaran 
rightly observed, there are no grounds to consider that the monitoring cannot concern 
other examples as well, at least due to the fact that the ―EU data protection law is meant 
to be technologically neutral‖
341
. Indeed, as the EDPB later defined more precisely, 
―tracking through other types of network or technology‖ used in ―wearable and other 
smart devices‖
342
 may also amount to monitoring. The specification that monitoring is 
applicable not only to online behavioural monitoring, but to offline in particular, once 
again confirms how all-embracing the monitor criterion proves to be. Also, as Granmar 
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noted, this brings the monitoring applicability to the non-EU controllers and processors 
outside the framework of e-commerce
343
. 
Based on the purposes and aims that are pursued, and taking into account the methods 
that a non-EU entity applies in order to monitor data subjects‘ behaviour in the Union, 
its data processing activities can be referred either to mapping, tracking or profiling 
activities. Notably, due to the rapid changes in the information society that take place 
continuously, it is not reasonable to consider existing monitoring activities as the 
ultimate ones. Therefore, it is suggested to regard the list of monitoring activities 
provided in the EDPB‘s Guidelines
344
 (which will be discussed hereinbelow) as an 
approximate list orienting us in the technological world.  
a) geo-localisation activities 
Geo-localisation is an extremely widespread monitoring activity due to the availability 
of Wi-Fi technology in practically all modern smartphones, tablets and other portable 
electronic devices. By using geo-localisation technology, a non-EU operator aims at 
determining the exact location of a data subject in order to, e. g., offer him or her the 
close by services. Geo-localisation is a good example of how monitoring works: first, a 
non-EU entity collects personal data of an individual in the Union through Wi-Fi 
tracking, afterwards, data is processed – most likely for the marketing purposes
345
 of the 
said entity, and, finally, if the purpose of monitoring is marketing, the respective 
advertisements or offers will be sent to the data subject.   
b) CCTV (video surveillance) 
Monitoring by means of CCTV (or closed-circuit television) envisages that when 
individuals happen to be in the field of view of video surveillance facilities, they are 
filmed. Notably, not any kind of such video recording is considered as monitoring, – the 
necessary requirement is that the natural persons have to be ―identified or otherwise 
singled out‖
346
 in the result, otherwise monitoring is useless if it is not known what 
exactly person is being surveyed.  
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c) online tracking through the use of cookies or fingerprinting 
Cookies and fingerprinting as the technologies for online tracking have much in 
common, therefore, it seems reasonable to discuss them jointly. Both cookies and 
fingerprinting refer to the device identification which, in turn, leads to a natural person 
who uses the said device, that is to say, a so-called ‗device identifier‘. As a result, the 
user‘s behaviour is being monitored every time when a person visits the website which 
has stored the indentifier onto device. 
It is worth noting that not all categories of cookies are covered by the monitoring 
criterion: the strictly necessary cookies, which are indispensable for normal functioning 
of a website, are a priori excluded. They are often session cookies and their life is 
conditional on the time of visit of a website, therefore, they do not collect any data that 
could be used by a non-EU controller in future. However, as regards preference, 
statistics, marketing, third-party or any other categories of cookies which imply 
purposeful targeting of the data subjects in the Union, they clearly indicate intention and 
purpose on the part of a non-EU operators to monitor individuals, so monitoring 
criterion will apply.  
Even if a non-EU controller does not utilize cookies (which is unlikely, though), it can 
still monitor the data subjects‘ behaviour through the identification of user‘s browser, 
which is also known as ‗browser fingerprinting‘
347
. The thing is that browsers send huge 
amount of data to the service providers ―to enable an optimized display of [the] website, 
such as type and version of the browser, the operating system, installed plug-ins […], 
language, header and cookie settings, the used monitor resolution and time zone‖
348
. 
Though the listed types of data speak in the first place of technical features of the 
browser and have little to do with the data subject as such, nevertheless, the browser 
fingerprint generated on their basis may, in combination ―with additional information 
such as IP addresses‖, allow identification of the website user
349
.  
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d) behavioural advertising 
Given activity envisages that a non-EU entity conducts monitoring of the individuals in 
the Union for the purpose of behavioural advertising. In essence, it means that a non-EU 
operator analyses data subjects‘ behaviour and on the basis of their preferences directs 
respective advertisements to them. This activity may embrace various forms of 
monitoring, including, but not limited to, online tracking, geo-localisation, profiling, 
since the range of sources where behavioural data can be get from is, roughly speaking, 
unlimited. 
Ustaran finds it controversial that the monitoring criterion may apply to the behavioural 
advertising even in the cases where the data subjects‘ personal data are not 
compromised, exemplifying the situation in which an Internet user simply receives an 
ad which corresponds to his or her browsing patterns and interests; scholar argues that it 
is common practice that aims at providing ―an ad about one particular product or service 
instead of another‖
350
. In theory, it could be so, if a non-EU entity had altruistic goals 
instead of marketing ones. However, it seems more probable that nowadays most of the 
companies, if not themselves, then through the third parties, use, reuse and sell personal 
data. In this respect, Skouma and Leonard consider that what operators indeed do with 
data is ‗invisible‘ to data subject and beyond his or her control since the processing 
includes many unknown puzzles, –  especially this concerns the non-EU processors and 
various recipients of data351. 
e) market surveys and other behavioural studies based on individual profiles 
The key purpose of the monitoring activity under consideration lies in its name – 
marketing. The studies or surveys related to the behaviour of individuals in the Union 
can be executed using both online or offline activities. They may include interviews of 
the data subjects, various forms of questionnaires or surveys, analyses of shopping 
behaviour through the customer database and so forth.  
Importantly, the subsequent analysis of data subjects‘ behaviour must be based on their 
existing individual profiles, or, in case of processing the personal data of new clients, 
such processing has to lead to the creation of a profile; as Korff states, the fact that a 
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profile is created is the best evidence that the data subject is being monitored
352
. 
Moreover, profiling has to evaluate individual characteristics of a person353 which 
uniquely describe the said person and allow distinguishing him or her from other data 
subjects. So, as just shown, for the applicability of monitoring criterion on the grounds 
of market surveys and other behavioural studies, the behaviour of each particular 
individual has to be analysed separately so that the said person can be identified.  
By contrast, if to apply the same activities, for example, to the EU market and analyse it 
as a whole, the monitoring criterion will not be invoked. The WP29 has provided 
helpful guidance in this respect. It clearly stipulates that, if a non-EU operator conducts 
―simple classification of individuals based on known characteristics such as their age, 
sex, and height‖, such activities do not necessarily constitute profiling 354. That is to say, 
if a non-EU entity pursues a goal to classify data subjects purely ―for statistical 
purposes‖ and does not intend to make any predictions about them, this will result in 
―an aggregated overview‖
355
, by contrast to specific individual profiles.  
There are other circumstances of behavioural monitoring under which a non-EU entity 
will not fall under Article 3(2)(b) GDPR. Skouma and Leonard particularly single out 
anonymous tracking of the website users, which in practice allows avoiding use of 
personal identifiers
356
. Also, collected personal data of the data subjects in the Union 
may be de-identified or, as discussed above, aggregated
357
. In all specified instances, the 
idea is that the collected data has to lose its ability to connect particular individual and 
the information about him or her, or to be unable by default to do that.  
f) other monitoring activities  
The EDPB singles out also ―personalised diet and health analytics services online‖ and 
―monitoring or regular reporting on an individual‘s health status‖
358
 as the monitoring 
activities, – obviously, for the reason of concerning sensitive data. Besides including 
special category of data, these types of monitoring activities do not have other 
peculiarities distinguishing them from the above contemplated activities. Thus, most of 
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the probability, they were singled out in order to emphasize on the applicability of 
monitoring principle to them, in case some non-EU entities are going to prejudice this.  
While defining concretely one monitoring activities, the EDPB has skipped some other 
which are not less important. For instance, it did not mention monitoring of the 
behaviour in relation to ―anti-money laundering checks, email monitoring in the 
employment context and fraud prevention‖
359
, while the latter, indeed, deserves separate 
consideration. 
Fraud prevention 
It is a global practice that banks monitor the use of the bank cards issued to their clients, 
particularly for the purpose of fraud prevention, especially closely ―when they travel 
abroad‖
360
. Of course, this is true for the non-EU banks as well. In this context, Korff 
exemplifies the hypothetical situation when a holder of a bank card (resident of the third 
country), which was issued by the non-EU bank, travels to one of the Member States of 
the Union, and the use of the said card in the territory of the EU is monitored by the 
non-EU bank (the issuer)
361
. As it follows, unexpectedly, but many facts of the case 
speak in favour of the application of Article 3(2)(b) GDPR. Firstly, the non-EU bank 
acts as a non-EU controller of the data processing. Secondly, the holder of the bank card 
is not a resident of the Union, however, this does not matter since at the moment of 
monitoring he was in the territory of the Union. Thirdly, the non-EU bank had clear 
purpose for monitoring – to prevent fraud – and intention to do so. And so forth. 
However, Korff rightly argues that despite all pros, the situation causes disproportionate 
difficulties in practice since it binds the non-EU bank to comply with the GDPR 
provisions, thus, the question is undecided
362
. 
The problem lies in the subjective component of the monitoring. The non-EU bank, 
indeed, had the purpose to prevent fraud by means of monitoring how its customers use 
the bank cards. On the one hand, it, most likely, did not mean to monitor them while 
they travel in the Union. However, on the other hand, since the nature of the monitoring 
activity at stake included the monitoring of the cards usage abroad, perhaps in the EU, 
the non-EU bank should have foreseen such probability. So, the question which is left 
opened is: ‗Did the non-EU bank purposefully intend to monitor the use of bank cards 
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realizing that its processing activities will concern monitoring in the Union?‘ If the 
answer is ‗yes‘, then the bank is subject to Article 3(2)(b) GDPR; if ‗no‘ – it might 
avoid the applicability of the monitoring criterion to its activities. 
3.7. Gap in Article 3 GDPR 
Arguably, there is a scenario that is not covered by either part of Article 3 GDPR (and 
not even by part 3(3) which is not contemplated in the paper). The hypothetical issue 
raised by Jay concerns the situation when the conditions stipulated in parts 1 and 2 of 
Article 3 GDPR are mixed so that neither can be applied
363
. This may potentially be the 
case if, for example, a US-based company that offers goods or services to data subjects 
in the Union or monitors their behaviour (does not really matter) has an establishment 
in the EU for lobbying purposes, and, importantly, that is the only presence that the US 
company has in the Union
364
. Indeed, the GDPR does not envisage such a combination 
of facts.  
The establishment principle cannot be applied here since, even though the non-EU 
company has the establishment in the EU, the processing is not carried out in the 
context of the activities of the said establishment – data processing based on targeting 
and monitoring activities lies too far from lobbying activities. Highly unlikely, 
depending on the other facts of the case, an inextricable link required under Article 3(1) 
GDPR may be proved. However, under available facts, that is impossible. 
As for the targeting principle, the required activities, such as offering or monitoring, are 
at place. However, the fact that the US company is presented through the establishment 
in the Union sits uncomfortably with the key provision of Article 3(2) GDPR which 
stipulates that the non-EU controller or processor has to be not established in the EU. 
Thus, the targeting principle is dismissed, too. 
It would be unreasonable in such situation to completely avoid the GDPR application to 
the data processing, especially if it concerns the data subjects in the Union
365
. Therefore, 
Jay considers that the European data protection authorities would interpret the GDPR 
provisions ―teleologically rather than literally‖ and read Article 3(2) GDPR as follows: 
―This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller or processor 
in the context of an establishment of the controller or processor outside the Union, 
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where the processing activities are related to [the offering of goods or services to, or the 
monitoring of the behaviour of, data subjects in the Union]‖
366
 (the differing from the 
original text part in italics). This way, Jay has omitted that part of the provision which 
prescribes that a controller or processor is not established in the Union. So, in such 
interpretation, it can be established, and that fact would not affect the applicability of 
Article 3(2) GDPR. Such a solution is rather controversial since it concedes the 
probability of overlapping with the establishment principle and, thus, whittles away the 
distinction between Article 3(1) and 3(2) GDPR.  
Nevertheless, the said solution deserves justification. As stated above, on the basis of 
processing personal data of the data subjects in the Union, data protection law must 
guarantee them protection. So, the lack of a suitable provision applicable in the specific 
case is not an argument of depriving data subjects in the Union of their right to 
protection. If choosing between the establishment and targeting principles, the latter 
gains an advantage. And that is obvious: the EU establishment is the only physical 
presence in the Union, it merely conducts lobbying activities and, presumably, does not 
contribute to data processing. On the contrary, the US establishment (possibly there are 
other establishments in the US as well) is a parent company, it definitely targets data 
subjects in the Union, processes their data and, moreover, does so in the context of the 
same establishment. So, if to weigh the arguments, the US company has much more to 
do with the data processing than its European subsidiary. Thereby, in the event 
discussed above, the Regulation would still apply to the data processing and, despite 
having features attributable to different parts of the provision, Article 3(2) GDPR is 
most likely to be applied in the teleological interpretation. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
There are two general criteria of the GDPR applicability to the data processing activities 
performed by a non-EU controller or processor – the establishment principle (Article 
3(1) GDPR) and the targeting principle (Article 3(2) GDPR). Both criteria are based on 
the explicit links with the EU – either through having establishment in the Union or 
targeting individuals in the territory of the EU. Applicability concerns one specific 
processing operation or set of operations of the same non-EU operator, thereby 
applicability of the Regulation in one case does not entail the applicability to the rest of 
processing activities of the same entity – each case requires separate consideration. 
In order to ascertain that a non-EU entity is subject to the GDPR, conditions stipulated 
under either the establishment principle (including establishment test) or the targeting 
principle (coincides with targeting test) must be met. Application of both tests at once to 
the same non-EU controller or processor is impossible since application of one test 
excludes applicability of the other. Whatever the circumstances of the case, 
establishment test has to be checked first, and only in the event of its inapplicability, the 
conditions of targeting can be tested. 
The establishment test allows ascertaining availability of an establishment in the EU by 
means of determining whether a non-EU controller or processor executes an activity 
through stable arrangements in the Union and whether the activity is real and effective, 
after that the activity has to be evaluated in the light of its nature and the services 
provided. In order to invoke Article 3(1) GDPR, processing has to be carried out in the 
context of the activities of the said establishment in the Union. 
The legal form of arrangements, – whether a branch, an office or a subsidiary, – is not 
decisive in respect to the application of the establishment criteria. Even lack of a 
registered office in the Union does not preclude a non-EU entity from having an 
establishment there within the meaning of EU data protection law. On the contrary, it is 
possible that a non-EU company can have a formally registered branch in the Union, 
however, that branch will not be considered an establishment for the purposes of EU 
data protection law. A travelling agent of the non-EU entity cannot constitute stable 
arrangement due to being unstable a priori, at least on the basis of not having a fixed 
location.  
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As regards a non-EU company providing services via the Internet, it is considered to be 
established in the place where it pursues economic activities. A website as such cannot 
be singled out as a separate stable arrangement, however, an establishment becomes 
established through the website. A non-EU entity cannot be admitted to have an 
establishment in the Union based solely on the fact that its website can be accessed from 
one of the Member States.  
Stability of arrangements is always relative: what is sufficiently stable in one case, 
might be not stable enough to be rendered establishment in another. Thus, the degree of 
stability always has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
In order to be considered real and effective, the activities exercised in an establishment 
in the Union must contribute to the data processing activities of the non-EU parent 
company and occur in the place of stable arrangements. Practically any kind of activities 
may be considered as related to the activities of the parent company, especially when a 
local establishment serves as a link between the data subjects and the non-EU entity.  
Processing in the context of the activities of an establishment in the Union implies that 
the establishment has to play a relevant role in a particular processing operation. If not 
the ‗in the context of‘ formula, it would be impossible to connect establishments in the 
Union with their parent companies and data processing standing behind them. The 
processing does not necessarily have to be done by an establishment itself, though it 
may be carried out so. Even if an EU establishment does not carry out any data 
processing operations itself, its other activities can still trigger the applicability of 
Article 3(1) GDPR to the data processing on the basis of being otherwise inextricably 
linked to the data processing operations of the non-EU parent company. The case law 
allows inferring that activities of the EU establishments that concern the EU sales 
offices, such as promotion or selling of advertising, marketing directing at the EU 
residents, commercial prospection, are likely to fall under ‗inextricable link‘. 
Nevertheless, ‗in the context of‘ formula remains problematic due to being potentially 
boundless and covering practically any connections between the non-EU operator 
performing processing and its establishment in the Union. 
The establishment principle applies differently to the non-EU controllers and processors 
within one processing operation. The ascertained applicability of the Regulation to one 
of them does not automatically invoke the applicability to the other. The GDPR 
controller obligations apply to joint controllers separately and in view of contribution of 
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each of them to the specific processing operation or its part. In case an EU controller 
which is subject to the GDPR uses a non-EU processor, the latter will become subject to 
the Regulation on the basis of indirect application through Article 28 GDPR by means 
of the contract or other legal act. By contrast, if a non-EU controller which is not subject 
to the GDPR uses an EU processor, the fact of applicability of the establishment 
principle to the EU processor will not actuate the applicability to the non-EU controller 
– the legal relationship at stake will concern provision of a processing service on behalf 
of the non-EU entity where the latter appears as a client and the EU processor as a 
contractor. 
Under exceptional circumstances, a non-EU controller may be applicable to the GDPR 
controller obligations due to having an establishment in the Union through the EU 
processor. The given case may occur only if the EU processor‘s activities are considered 
inextricably linked (for instance, essential to revenue-raising) to the processing carried 
out by the non-EU controller. 
Even if a non-EU entity is not established in the Union, the GDPR can still apply to it 
through targeting criteria. The targeting principle is oriented purely towards the 
controllers and processors that are not established in the Union and also focuses on 
those non-EU entities which do not process personal data in the context of the activities 
of their EU establishments (if such are available). The applicability of the targeting 
principle may be possible on precondition that the establishment principle is not 
applicable. 
The concept of targeting characterizes not only the scope of the nature of the activities, 
i. e., targeting as an activity, but also defines the subjective component of the non-EU 
entities which is to reach the data subjects in the Union – targeting as a goal. So, to 
invoke application of the targeting principle, the activities must have features 
attributable to targeting. 
In order to determine whether a non-EU controller or processor directs its activities at 
the data subjects in the Union, it is necessary to apply the targeting test which includes 
checking whether the processing of personal data concerns the data subjects who are in 
the Union and determining whether the processing is related to either the offering of 
goods or services or to the monitoring of data subjects‘ behaviour within the Union. 
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The scope of a data subject in the Union is not limited to any legal status defining a 
physical person. In the context of Article 3(2) GDPR, the only significant circumstance 
is that the data subject in question is located within the EU. 
To be located in the Union in terms of spatial scope means that a data subject is 
physically present in the territory of the EU. The duration of the physical presence is not 
decisive. The most important thing is that the processing of personal data takes place at 
some point of time during stay in the EU. Even in cases of online behaviour, the data 
subjects must be physically present in the Union, notably when accessing the Internet. 
The data subjects‘ being in the Union has to be evaluated at the moment when the 
processing related to the relevant targeting activity – monitoring the behaviour or 
offering of goods or services – takes place. A non-EU controller or processor becomes 
pursued under Article 3(2) GDPR at the moment of collection (in a broad sense) of 
personal data. Therefore, requirement that data subjects have to be located within the 
EU concerns only the time of collection of their personal data; subsequent leave of the 
Union does not affect applicability of Article 3(2) GDPR to the non-EU operator. 
Monitoring as such consists of the targeting and the immediate data processing which 
happens at the same time as the targeting activity. In essence, targeting becomes 
monitoring only when it is accompanied by data processing. Thus, if personal data of a 
data subject in the Union was not processed, this means that the data subject was not 
monitored. For the applicability of Article 3(2) GDPR on the basis of monitoring, there 
need to be two conditions met: first, a non-EU controller or processor monitors the 
behaviour of a data subject in the Union, i. e., targets a data subject and processes the 
data subject‘s personal data, second, the data subject is physically present in the Union. 
Unlike in monitoring, the moment of offering goods or services is not a data processing 
yet. Offering as such does not necessarily include processing, especially if it concerns 
offline activities. Therefore, if offering does not draw after it the data processing, it will 
not invoke the application of Article 3(2) GDPR. As regards offering of goods or 
services online, in fact any offering will additionally invoke processing of personal data 
since the mere visit of the website will lead to the processing. For the applicability of 
Article 3(2) GDPR on the basis of offering, the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
first, a non-EU controller or processor offers goods or services to a data subject in the 
EU, second, the data subject is physically present in the Union, third, the data 
processing takes place when the data subject is in the EU. To invoke the targeting 
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principle, it is important that the data subject is located in the Union not when the offer 
is made, but when the processing related to the offer is carried out.  
There are certain general criteria indicating that a non-EU controller or processor 
intentionally targets data subjects in the Union by offering goods or services to them.   
The specifically mentioned EU individuals or the specific advertising in the EU territory 
speak in favour of targeting data subjects in the Union. By contrast, the less specific 
offering is, the less probably it will be ascertained as targeting individuals in the EU. 
Also, offering needs to be accompanied with the processing which relates to it. For this 
reason, processing of personal data related to employment matters cannot invoke 
application of Article 3(2)(a) GDPR since it does not foresee per se any offers of goods 
or services to the employees. Furthermore, offering has to target individuals in the 
Union ab origin, therefore, when individuals from the third countries enter the EU and 
continue using the non-EU service in the Union, this does not change the fact that the 
service still targets individuals in the third states only.  
Finally, offering requires intention. Objective targeting implies that offering activities 
include an objective intention of a non-EU operator to direct its activities to data 
subjects in the Union, and this intention is manifested through objective evidences.   
The availability of just one evidence may be insufficient to ascertain a non-EU 
controller‘s intention of offering, nevertheless, this will depend on the facts of a 
concrete case. So, as a general recommendation, it is suggested that the more factors of 
offering are ascertained, the better. The indices of offering (are discussed closely in the 
paper) are not exhaustive. Their common feature is that each evidence has many ‗buts‘, 
and the applicability depends on the content of the website (in case of online offering), 
thus, must be evaluated in the light of other evidences of directing. 
So far as Article 3(2)(b) GDPR captures wider range of grounds for the applicability of 
the Regulation since it is likely to cover all sorts of online as well as offline activities, it 
will most likely catch those non-EU operators who target the EU, however, managed to 
bypass the grounds found in Article 3(2)(a) GDPR.  
In order to ascertain that a non-EU entity monitors the individuals‘ behaviour within the 
Union, two things need to be established: first, data subjects tracking on the Internet, 
and, second, potential subsequent use of data processing techniques that envisage 
profiling of the data subjects. While tracking can be objectively ascertained, the 
subjective intention is not that easy to determine. It seems rational to take the same 
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approach which is used in application of offering criterion, that is to say, ascertaining 
whether a non-EU entity actively demonstrates its intention to target – here: to monitor 
– individuals in the Union.  
Monitoring requires an intentional purpose which implies that monitoring must be 
intentional by default. The lack of will to further use the data processing techniques to 
the collected data demonstrates the absence of intention to monitor, which has to be 
present on the whole way of monitoring activities. Therefore, for instance, passive, i. e., 
without intention, continuing collection of data regarding the natural persons‘ behaviour 
within the Union will not present monitoring.  
Purposes for which the non-EU controllers monitor the data subjects‘ behaviour in the 
Union vary. Often they are marketing or advertising. Activities, such as decision-
making, analysis, prediction, collection, reuse etc., are actions that accompany and at 
the same time serve as interim steps towards the ultimate goal which is conditional on 
the factual purpose of monitoring. 
Monitoring activities may consist of tracking on the Internet or through other types of 
network or technology used in wearable and other smart devices. Data processing 
activities can be referred either to mapping, tracking or profiling activities. The main 
feature shared by all monitoring activities is that the monitored data subject can be 
identified in the result, i. e., monitoring activity is supposed to enable connecting 
particular individual and the information about him or her. The fact of creation of a 
profile on the data subject is the best evidence that the data subject is being monitored. 
 
